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Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies 
 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
 
Abstract  
 
This Article analyzes the doctrinal instruments federal courts use 
to allocate scarce adjudicative resources over competing demands 
for constitutional remedies. It advances two claims. The first is that 
a central, hitherto underappreciated, doctrinal instrument for 
rationing judicial resources is a demand that most constitutional 
claimants demonstrate that an official violated an exceptionally 
clear, unambiguous constitutional rule—that is, not only that the 
Constitution was violated, but that the violation evinced a 
demanding species of fault. This fault rule first emerged in 
constitutional tort jurisprudence. It has diffused to the suppression 
and postconviction review contexts. The Article’s second claim is 
that fault-based rationing of constitutional remedies flows, to an 
underappreciated degree, from a commitment to judicial 
independence. Federal courts have developed branch-level 
autonomy, along with distinctly institutional interests, over the 
twentieth century. These interests are inconsistent with the 
vindication of many individualized constitutional claims. While 
ideological preferences and changing socioeconomic conditions 
have had well-recognized influences on the path of constitutional 
remedies, I argue that the judiciary’s institutional preferences 
have also played a large role. This causal link between judicial 
independence and remedial rationing raises questions about 
federal courts’ function in the Separation of Powers.  
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Introduction 
 
Article III adjudication is a scarce good.1 This is not just a function of rising caseloads, 
statutory as well as constitutional, outstripping federal courts’ capacity.2 It also flows inexorably 
from the fact that settled constitutional rules are daily broken. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, 
the Supreme Court fashioned a thick network of constitutional rules to bind police officers, 
prisons officials, prosecutors, state trial court judges, and front-line bureaucrats.3 These rules are 
often observed now only in the breach. Even in the well-structured, closely supervised context of 
state criminal courts, there is ample evidence constitutional rights are systemically flouted.4 
Some municipal justice systems may stay solvent by illegally depriving citizens of basic 
liberties. 5  On our nation’s streets, constitutional violations are routinized in some urban 
neighborhoods.6 And we have simply no reliable way to know how often zoning officials, 
welfare bureaucrats, or prison guards act on unconstitutional grounds or discard mandatory 
procedures.  
 
So mundane and so frequent are violations of settled constitutional rules that federal 
courts plainly lack capacity to offer relief in all cases given their current levels of staffing and 
resources. True, federal courts need write no new law to resolve these cases. But even if the law 
is clear, there are, as Blackstone observed “above a hundred of our lawsuits [that] arise from 
disputed facts, for one in which the law is doubted of.”7 Even if constitutional rules were 
wrought with crystalline transparency, the demands of factual adjudication mean that not even a 
                                                            
1 Judicial recognition of this point is frequent. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (“Courts 
should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of 
constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case.”) (internal quotes 
omitted); see also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As A Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges 
Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 401 & n.2 (2013) 
(collecting statements by judges and numerical evidence of increasing caseload pressures). 
2 Between 1990 and 2012, federal district courts’ combined civil and criminal caseload rose by 31 percent, whereas 
the number of judges rose by 17.7 percent. United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures 2012 Table 6.1: Total 
Civil and Criminal Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending (Including Transfers), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures-2012.aspx.  
3 For a celebratory account, see MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998). 
4 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon's Broken Promise: 
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice: A Report on the American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right 
to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_ 
defendants/initiatives/indigent_defense_systems_improvement/gideons_broken_ promise.html; 
see also Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (cataloging 
many more entrenched practices in state criminal courts that violate defendants’ constitutional rights). 
5 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Missouri Suburbs Sued Over Gauntlet of Traffic Fines and Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A8 (describing law suit challenging municipal policies resulting in routine jailing of the 
poor). Alice Goffman’s recent ethnography of inner-city Philadelphia is also replete with examples of how basic 
liberty rights are routinely violated by urban criminal justice systems. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE 
IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2104).  
6 A 2002 Bureau of Justice national survey thus estimated that police used force against individuals on 664,500 
instances annually, and that approximately 500,000 of those usages were perceived to be excessive. Matthew R. 
Durose et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contacts between Police and the Public: Findings 
from the 2002 National Survey, at v (2005).  
7 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 330 (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 1765-69) 
(spelling adjusted). 
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fraction of constitutional violations can be resolved in federal court. For this reason alone, the 
supposedly “settled and invariable principle” of public law, famously articulated by Chief Justice 
John Marshall, “that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper 
redress”8 is increasingly elusive.  
  
But if some rationing of constitutional remedies is inevitable, how is it to be done—and, 
just as importantly, by whom? This Article analyzes the how and who questions prompted by 
remedial scarcity in constitutional law. It advances two claims. First, the Court has developed a 
gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional remedies ranging from constitutional 
tort to habeas to the exclusionary rule. In a previous article, I identified in passing this 
transubstantive migration, but did not analyze comprehensively its causes or effects.9 Building 
on that work here, I develop a more extensive account here of the fault’s role in constitutional 
remediation. Second, I contend that standard accounts of the narrowing of constitutional 
remedies since the 1980s have omitted one important factor: judicial independence has enabled 
and motivates the fault-based gatekeeping system used for constitutional remedies. Because the 
fault rule emerges directly from the federal courts’ ability and willingness to pursue distinctive 
institutional interests and preferences, these lines of cases suggest that rather than enabling the 
vindication of constitutional rights, the independence of Article III tribunals can impede their 
realization. In positing a causal connection between judicial independence and the fault barrier to 
constitutional remediation, I do not aim to deny that other factors, including judicial ideology, 
the politics of crime, or beliefs about the moral worth of relevant rights holding populations, 
have played a role. Nevertheless, the distinctive contribution of this Article is an excavation and 
analysis of one causal strand of judicial behavior that to date has been largely ignored.  
 
The term “fault” is a legal term of art requiring definition.10 Following the Supreme 
Court, I use the term “fault” in a specific, narrow sense. In this constitutional remedies context, 
the term “fault” is used to pick out cases in which it was not possible for the offender to 
“reasonably believe” they were acting consistent with the Constitution.11 That is, a fault-based 
gatekeeping rule requires that a constitutional litigant identify not merely a constitutional 
violation, but an especially clear and unambiguously applicable constitutional rule that was self-
evidently violated.12 The magnitude of the legal error, that is, must be substantial. The Court, that 
is, could plausibly (and with some gain in accuracy) have used a term such as “unreasonable 
fault,” but it did not do so, and it would be confusing to innovate in terminology here. And while 
the Court employs the language of blameworthiness, the term fault in this concern does not pick 
out any facts about the state of the defendant’s state of mind.  
                                                            
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 147 (1803). In this passage, Chief Justice Marshall was discussing 
the common law writ system, in which such a one-to-one correspondence between rights and remedies existed. The 
quotation  
9 Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 582 (2014) [hereinafter “Huq, Habeas”] 
(discussing the role of fault). A student note published later the same year also noted commonality of approaches 
across remedial domains, largely to criticize rather than to explain. See Thomas K.S. Fu, Against Doctrinal 
Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 293, 297 (2014).  
10 Cf. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419-20 (2002) (exploring the overlapping 
meanings of fault and culpability) 
11 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 82, 98 (1989).  
12 One might reasonably protest that the Court should employ a term such as “unreasonable fault,” but it has not 
done so. I shall confuse matters by diverting from its terminology. 
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The Article’s first contribution is to show how a gatekeeping fault rule emerged and 
assumed a supervisory role in titrating most individualized constitutional remedies.13 Fault is a 
familiar element of constitutional tort doctrine in the form of the qualified immunity defense, and 
also a (less noticed) dimension of municipal liability doctrine.14 Fault has also spilled over into 
the substantive law of certain constitutional provisions that commonly form the basis of 
constitutional tort actions, such as the Due Process Clause. Less noticed still is fault’s contagion 
into new remedial contexts and even some substantive law domains.15 Since the late 1980s, it has 
come to dominate the law of postconviction relief for prisoners under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Further, 
it is increasingly the modal gatekeeping rule for criminal defendants seeking a suppression 
remedy after a Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation. One consequence of fault’s ascendency 
within the doctrinal framework of constitutional remedies is that modal question in constitutional 
litigation today is therefore no longer whether the Constitution has been violated. It is rather 
whether the violation was sufficiently clear and self-evident to warrant the expenditure of scarce 
judicial resources. Another consequence is that the benefit of the doubt in almost all close cases 
goes to the state, not the putative rights holder.  
 
Why has this version of fault, which hinges on the clarity of the violation at the time it 
occurred and favors the state, become the organizing principle of remedial rationing? The 
Article’s second contribution is a causal hypothesis: One of the important, yet wholly 
overlooked, causes of the fault-based rationing system for constitutional remedies is from the 
institutional independence of the judiciary.16 My hypothesis, to be clear at the threshold, is not 
that remedial rationing is solely or uniquely a downstream effect of judicial independence. 
Contemporary accounts of the Burger Court noted the role of ideological interests and historical 
circumstances in shaping the path of constitutional remedies.17 I do not revisit or cast doubt on 
                                                            
13 See infra Part I (extending and substantiating this account).  
14 Professor John Jeffries has written a series of important articles identifying and defending the regulative role of 
fault in constitutional tort. See Jeffries, Compensation, supra note 11, at 96-101; see also John C. Jeffries, The 
Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 209 (2013) (presenting “a unified theory of 
constitutional torts”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000) 
[hereinafter “Jeffries, Disaggregating”]; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 
YALE L. J. 87, 98–100 (1999); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 47, 49 (1998). Jeffries, however, has not extended the analysis beyond the constitutional tort context as this 
Article seeks to do.  
15 In charting the spillover of fault to the definition of substantive rights, I confess to stepping beyond my remedial 
remit in order to illuminate the doctrine better.  
16 By referring to judicial independence, I do not refer to the sense of “decisional independence of individual judges” 
but in the sense of “the institutional independence of the judiciary as a whole.” Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of 
Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 967 (2007). 
17 See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' 
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983) (arguing that the Burger Court favored “judicial deregulation of 
state and federal criminal justice officials,” and showed “hostility to fair process norms that impair the state's 
capacity to detect and punish the factually guilty); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some 
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1227 (1971) 
(noting the “[i]deological ebb and flow” in the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence); Louis Michael Seidman, 
Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. 
L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) (arguing that “Burger Court is undoubtedly more interested than its predecessor in using the 
criminal process to effect broadscale crime prevention and control” but also noting that these aspects of the Court 
had been overstated). 
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those claims. Nevertheless, while the literature has canvassed extensively the role of ideological 
change on the Court, it has not yet grappled with the important role that the interests and 
preferences of the judiciary as an institution have played in shaping the doctrine of constitutional 
remedies. In the absence of strong judicial independence, I hypothesize, remedial rationing 
would not have taken the form, or perhaps gone to the lengths, observed today. It is infeasible 
now to disentangle the precise causal contributions of partisan ideology and the judiciary’s 
institutional interests. I do not try to do so, but rather aim to show how an account of recent 
constitutional doctrine without accounting for institutional interest is incomplete.  
 
Supplementing extant accounts of doctrinal change with institutional concerns is of no 
mere antiquarian interest. It has contemporary ramifications. An account of remedial rationing 
leaning wholly on ideological change would imply that changing the composition of the Court 
now will conduce to a change in the availability of remedies. By contrast, my account predicts 
that this will not be so. Rather, even a high court with a higher proportion of members appointed 
by Democrats would not behave all that differently. For whatever partisan flag they try to 
occlude, Justices of left and right alike have historically evinced a powerful allegiance to the 
institutional concerns of the Article III courts—or so I will try to show.  
 
No smoking gun underwrites this hypothesis about institutional interests. Rather, the 
evidence I will present for a causal link between judicial independence and remedial rationing is 
circumstantial in character. As a threshold matter, I demonstrate that the two standard reasons for 
explaining remedial rationing are incomplete. First, the current doctrinal regime for redressing 
violations of individual constitutional rights cannot be explained by reference to legislative 
action alone. In many statutory domains, including civil rights, Congress has played a large role 
in creating and modifying remedies.18 Not so when it comes to strictly constitutional remedies. 
Although Congress has influenced some remedial regimes, its most important interventions have 
come too late to have causal force, and too often merely embodied previously articulated judicial 
preferences. 19  Second, ideological preferences over constitutional rights and rights-holding 
populations do not explain all doctrinal change. To a greater extent than appreciated, 
constitutional remedies have been narrowed by ideologically mixed coalitions of the Court. And 
standard ideological reasons, such as a concern that certain remedies will overdeter state 
officials, beg more questions than they resolve. The poverty of both standard accounts points to 
the need for alternative explanations, and opens the way for an new accounting. 
 
I propose to supplement standard accounts by highlighting the role played by the 
judiciary’s institutional interests.20 The positive case for attributing remedial rational to judicial 
independence, in addition to ideology, starts from the context in which the doctrine changed. The 
gatekeeping role of fault crystallized largely in the early 1980s. In this era, new pressures 
impinged on the Article III judiciary. These pressures arose, in particular, from the rise of mass 
incarceration, which began in the early 1980, and which created metastasizing demands for 
                                                            
18 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1077 (1991). 
19 See Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 531 n.44; see also infra text accompanying notes 198 to 200.  
20 For an empirical account of the judiciary’s institutional development emphasizing the vast gains it has made in 
legitimacy and authority, see Kevin McGuire, The Institutionalization of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 
128 (2004). For a historical account also illustrating the steep gradient in institutional growth, see JUSTIN CROWE, 
BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012). 
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criminal adjudication and postconviction review.21 Further, recent empirical work demonstrates 
that the Justicess’ behavior is often shaped by “institutional”22 considerations that to date have 
been largely ignored. Indeed, Justices have explicitly, if occasionally, identified institutional 
interests as a motive in narrowing constitutional remedies. Finally, an analysis of the remedial 
contexts in which the Court has not extended the fault rule supports the inference that 
institutional incentives are at work in shaping the doctrine. 
 
This causal vector—from the judiciary’s institutional interests to remedial constriction—
is not only missing from previous accounts, but is roughly the inverse of one standard account in 
the literature, offered by the late William Stuntz. According to Stuntz, it was the generosity of 
federal constitutional remediation that induced legislatures to tilt toward more punitive policies.23 
While recognizing this account as theoretically sophisticated and parsimonious, I supplement 
previous empirical criticisms24 by suggesting that constitutional doctrine responded to—and did 
not cause—the massive changes in the volume and punitiveness of American criminal justice 
systems starting the 1970s, with the judiciary’s institutional interests playing an important 
mediating role.  
 
The principal aims of this Article are descriptive: the identification and diagnosis of an 
immanent rationing principle governing much constitutional remedies doctrine, and the 
development of a hypothesis, supported by circumstantial evidence, of one important causal 
force. This analysis, important on its own terms, also clears ground for normative analysis of 
what role federal courts can play, or ought to play, in the enforcement of settled constitutional 
rules. Determining the optimal degree of judicial enforcement of constitutional rules is a large 
task, one that in part turns on considerations of what role is best assigned to the political 
branches and to state actors. I do not claim to solve that recalcitrant problem here. Still, my 
analysis of remedial scarcity has immediate and important normative and theoretical 
implications. Perhaps most importantly, it should unsettle some persistently unexamined truisms 
of constitutional law.  
 
Conventional Separation of Powers jurisprudence takes it for granted that the 
independence of Article III judges exists “‘not to benefit the judges,’ but ‘as a limitation imposed 
in the public interest’ … by helping to secure an independence of mind and spirit necessary if 
judges are “to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers 
which constitutes political liberty.’”25 As recently as March 2015, members of the Court have 
pronounced without contradiction that “the ‘separation of powers’ [is] essential to the protection 
                                                            
21 See generally TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2014). 
22 Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 321, 323 (2007). 
23 See William J. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 
107 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) [hereinafter “Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship”]; see also William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).  
24 For a devastating analysis of the empirics of Stuntz’s claims, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local 
Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2013).  
25 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568 (2001) (citations omitted); accord Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249 
(1920) (“The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would 
be assured by vesting the three great powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, in separate 
departments.”). 
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of individual liberty.”26 This truism assumes an alignment between judicial incentives and the 
vindication of “individual rights” and “political liberty.” But Separation of Powers theory is 
peculiarly silent on how that alignment might come about, or why institutional incentives would 
necessarily conduce to the vindication of rights.27 This Article’s account of remedial rationing in 
the shadow of judicial independence demonstrates that judicial incentives and the interests of 
constitutional rights holders need not run together. Instead, they not only can, but do, diverge 
sharply as a result of the judiciary’s institutional interests. These can stand starkly at odds with 
the rights-holding public’s concerns. This gap should provoke hesitation before mechanically 
endorsing canonical Separation of Powers assumptions. It also may yield cause to question 
efficiency-based and distributive justice-based justifications for assigning a central role in 
constitutional rights enforcement to the federal courts.  
The analysis offered in this article is limited along three important dimensions. First, I 
focus here solely on constitutional claims, not statutory claims, and limit my analysis to doctrines 
regulating the capacity of courts to respond to allegations of a constitutional wrong (e.g., by 
suppressing evidence by vacating a conviction, or by awarding damages). For this reason, I label 
this limited domain one concerning constitutional remedies, i.e., individualized requests for 
judicial responses to constitutional wrong. These cases comprise a significant slice of the federal 
docket—with prisoner cases taking up about a fifth of the number of civil suits filed in district 
courts in recent years.28 Hence, while judicial workload is also a function of statutory causes of 
cases, the domain addressed here is nontrivial in scope, and hence worthy of independent 
study.29 Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the Court acts as if it has a heightened 
measure of policy-making discretion when it comes to constitutional remedies, as opposed to 
statutory forms with respect to which it purports to hew to congressional will. Hence, although 
remedial rationing might plausibly be studied in respect to other statutory domains (say, 
immigration law or social security claims) or other procedural devices (say, the dwindling of the 
class action), the area of constitutional remedies with which I am concerned represents a 
particularly fertile perspective on judicial preferences and behavior.30  
                                                            
26 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011)). 
27 The failure of traditional Separation of Powers theory to specify a persuasive causal channel for claimed effects of 
institutional design is has been noted in other contexts. For an application in the context of legislative/executive 
relations, see, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2311, 2324–25 (2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with party 
than with branch . . . . [P]arty is likely to be the single best predictor of political agreement and disagreement.”); see 
also Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 1006, 1012 (2014) (expressing 
skepticism about the necessary connection between the functional separation of different elements of governmental 
power and the promotion of liberty). 
28  Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, District Courts, tbl. 3, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx. 
29 Parallel accounts might be told in regard to other domains of public law. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The 
Disappearing Shadow of Public Law, – YALE L. J. – (forthcoming 2015). 
30 My focus on remedies means that I also do not attend to other devices for limiting the flow of claims or reducing 
the costs of adjudication in this domain. One might also look at attorney’s fees. For example, in Buckcannon Board 
& Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, the Court interpreted the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, to permit fees awards only when a judgment, court-approved settlement, or 
some other order formally changed the legal relationship between the parties. 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001). In an 
equitable suit challenging an institutional practice after Buckcannon, defendants can litigate equitable claims to the 
point of judgment, and then avoid fees by consenting to the relief requested.  
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Second, my argument concerns federal courts as axiomatic loci for the vindication of 
federal constitutional rights.31 I do not assume (implausibly) that federal courts are the sole 
venue for vindicating those rights. On the contrary, federal courts must often stay their hand to 
allow state courts a first effort at resolving a constitutional issue,32 while state courts can also 
play a role in vindicating constitutional entitlements even when their perpetrator is a fellow 
member of the state bar.33 Nevertheless, even if state courts are “presumed competent to resolve 
federal issues,34 it is hard to see how they could play a comprehensive role. State courts cannot 
issue mandatory writs against federal officials,35 or free a federal prisoner from unlawful 
confinement.36 More diffusely but as importantly, federal courts today by “consensus” occupy a 
dominant position among courts when it comes to the vindication of constitutional rights.37 In 
addition to state courts, there are also sites of constitutional enforcement within the federal 
government. The executive branch, for example, wields large authority over determinations of 
how laws are enforced and defended from constitutional attack, supplying a nonjudicial forum 
for rights vindication.38 A 1994 statute also vests the Department of Justice with authority to 
force institutional reform in police departments.39 But §14141’s deployment is neither uniform 
nor comprehensive.40 Even with executive aid, the federal judiciary still provides a unique 
fulcrum from which rights can be leverage 
 
                                                            
31 Hence, this Article does not address the different ways in which structural constitutional values might be enforced. 
Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2013) (analyzing the choice 
between public and private enforcement of structural constitutional values). 
32 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (limiting the availability of pretrial federal injunctive relief 
against state criminal process). The role of state courts was especially important in the early Republic. See Alfred 
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1142 (1969) (“Despite their remedial deficiencies, it was 
the state courts that were looked to [before 1875] for the vindication of constitutional rights, subject to review by the 
Supreme Court.”). For an example of path-marking state court action on constitutional rights, see Goodridge v. Dep't 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under state constitutional 
law). 
33 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985) (expressing “confidence that state judges, no less than their federal 
counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants”); see also 
Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475 (2013) (noting that state postconviction 
proceedings “are being forced to assume a new role in the development of federal constitutional criminal 
procedure”). 
34 Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150 (1988).  
35 McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821) (holding that a federal official’s “conduct could only be 
controlled by the power that created him”). 
36 Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
37 Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 111-25 
(1997) [hereinafter “Woolhandler, Common Law Origins”] (arguing that there is a “consensus that the federal courts 
should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional rights”). 
38 Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1001-02 (2012) 
(discussing modalities of executive enforcement of the Constitution). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (authorizing the Justice Department to seek injunctive relief against departments with a pattern 
of unconstitutional conduct). 
40 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 57-61 
(2009) (noting “the Justice Department's failure to achieve widespread results” using § 14141, but questioning 
feasibility of supplementing it). 
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Finally, this Article analyzes the remedial function of the federal courts, not its distinct 
role in defining rights.41 This focus on constitutional remedies builds upon an emerging body of 
scholarship recognizing that questions of “what to do about a completed or threatened violation 
of law” are “distinct from the question of whether there has been or is about to be a violation.” 42 
That literature, though, has to date not focused on the scarcity problem. It has instead examined 
the interaction between remedial design and the substance of constitutional rights, not the 
solution for remedial scarcity.43 While this work contains important insights, it assumes that 
remedial design is a function of how courts view substantive rights. In contrast, this Article takes 
remedial design on its own terms, considers how and why it developed, and identifies normative 
implications—particularly for the Separation of Powers.  
 
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I establishes the centrality of fault in the 
rationing of three individualized constitutional remedies—money damages actions, 
postconviction relief from unconstitutionally imposed criminal sentences, and the suppression of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Part II turns to the etiology of 
fault’s regulative role. I argue that the rise of fault cannot be ascribed solely to Congress or the 
shifting ideological preferences of the Justices—perhaps the two most obvious alternatives. I 
then offer positive evidence to support the hypothesis that one of its underappreciated causes is 
judicial independence. Part III then examines some normative consequences of this between 
judicial independent and the regulative role of fault, In particular, I suggest that the account of 
remedial rationing offered here casts doubt on some central assumptions in Separation of Powers 
jurisprudence.  
 
I. Fault and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies 
  
This Part advances the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court has installed a 
requirement of fault as a threshold gatekeeping rule for constitutional remedies. This fault rule 
arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It diffused from constitutional tort law to postconviction 
habeas law and the rules governing the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment violations. It has also seeped into the substantive law in some domains. In its modal 
form, the fault-based gatekeeping rule observed across these domains requires that an individual 
litigant must demonstrate that the relevant constitutional violation was clear and unambiguous at 
the moment of the alleged violation in order to access either trial or a remedial order.  
 
                                                            
41 For examples of scholarship that explores how courts define rights in optimal or suboptimal ways, compare 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1212, 1215 (1978) (describing and criticizing underenforcement of equal protection norms), with Emily Sherwin, 
Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2006) (defending the common-law method of generating 
constitutional rules).  
42 Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became A Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164-65 (2008).  
43 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. 
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP.CT. REV. 237, 244-45 (2011) (considering interactions between 
changes in exclusionary rule doctrine and qualified immunity doctrine for the development of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 670, 706 (2011) [hereinafter “Laurin, Trawling”] (suggesting the Court’s impetus for “conceiving 
of the exclusionary rule as a remedy premised upon fault and desert” derives from constitutional tort doctrine). 
 9 
A fault rule of this kind emerged first constitutional tort law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
so-called Bivens suits;44 spread to the exclusionary rule in Fourth and (increasingly) Fifth 
Amendment contexts; and also to postconviction review of state and federal convictions.45 I 
should be explicit here that this list does not cover the waterfront of constitutional remedies. 
Indeed, I shall argue in Part II that the Court has conspicuously failed to extend the fault rule to 
other sorts of constitutional challenges.46 So my claim here is not that the Court has evinced 
blanket skepticism or hostility to constitutional remediation. Rather, I aim here to chart the 
domain in which the Court has erected barriers to some forms of relief—domains in which the 
demand for remediation is especially steep—while bracketing consideration of why that rule has 
not been extended further until Part II.  
 
To analyze the regulative function of fault in constitutional remedies, I begin by briefly 
summarizing how the remedial mechanisms at issue evolved from, and superseded, a common 
law framework of constitutional enforcement mechanisms. Unlike previous accounts, I 
underscore the migration of rationing rules from the familiar context of qualified immunity into 
not just some domains of constitutional law, but also parallel remedial mechanisms such as the 
exclusionary rule and postconviction habeas.47 Moreover, unlike previous accounts, my account 
deliberately underscores the fact that fault has become central not because of legislative choice, 
but rather as a consequence of unbounded judicial policy discretion. The fact that judges, rather 
than policy-makers in the political branches, have been at the forefront in responding to the 
problem of remedial scarcity in constitutional law is central to the causal link between judicial 
independence and remedial rationing that I develop at length in Part II.  
 
A. The Remedial Dispensation for Individualized Constitutional Wrongs 
 
The current dispensation for constitutional remediation is of relatively recent vintage. 
From the Republic’s founding until the early twentieth century, courts enforced constitutional 
rules largely via state-law tort and contract actions for damages into which federal-law elements 
could be injected.48 Even the federal government could be brought into constitutional compliance 
using a common-law action such as ejectment.49 Constitutional adjudication would typically 
arise in common law contexts when a state defendant endeavored to deflect liability in pointing 
                                                            
44 Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971), the 
Court created a private cause of action for money damages against federal officials in their personal capacity who 
violate certain constitutional rules. Bivens involved a Fourth Amendment violation; the Court has subsequently been 
“circumspect” about extending the Bivens cause of action to other contexts. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, 
Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 118 (2009).  
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (authorizing federal courts to grant habeas relief to prisoners); §§ 2254 & 2255 (setting 
forth, respectively, rules for state prisoners and federal prisoners). 
46 See infra Part II.B. 
47 This is called “borrowing” by Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
459, 463 (2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “an interpretive practice characterized by a deliberate effort to 
bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive ends”). 
48 Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How it Changed, and How the Court 
Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 134 (2012) (noting that the Constitution was originally “to be implemented 
through remedies available for violations of common law rights”); accord Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, 
supra note 37, at 79-81. 
49  Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some 
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 882-86 (1970) (describing this practice).  
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to a source of official authority and the plaintiff in response involved the Constitution to pierce 
that defense.50 In these early cases, courts’ role was limited to determining whether the conduct 
in litigation was lawful and then deciding whether “to award damages.”51 It was then up to the 
legislature to determine whether to indemnify the defendant official.52  
 
This common-law system of enforcement “dwindled”53 over time for several interlocking 
reasons. First, state-law tort actions raising constitutional issues “by ‘imperceptible steps’ came 
to be seen as federal causes of action” by the end of the nineteenth century.54 Second, federal 
judges in the mid-1800s began to invoke with increasing frequency inchoate conceptions of 
immunity to deflect private suits against state actors, with the result that common-law damages 
actions for constitutional violations “atroph[ied].”55 For example, ejectment actions against the 
federal government, once common, came to seem eccentric, even impermissible.56 Third, the 
post-Civil War economic boom led to a wave of regulation that in turn fed demand for property 
right-like protections from unconstitutional state action that could not be satisfied via the 
traditional common law forms.57 Finally, the common-law writ system itself fell into desuetude 
as simplified pleading, embodied in the 1934 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came to 
dominate judicial practice.58 
 
 To fill the gap left by common law actions, federal courts drew upon statutory causes of 
action and innovated to create new remedial pathways. This Part focuses on three remedial 
pathways, all of special relevance for vindicating individuals’ constitutional rights against 
routine unconstitutional actions by line police officers, prosecutors, and bureaucrats. These three 
mechanisms are constitutional tort actions, postconviction habeas actions, and motions for the 
exclusion of unconstitutionally secured evidence in the course of a criminal trial. These remedies 
have important commonalities. Each targets a discrete official action usually targeting a 
particular individual, not a policy or statutory command, and seeks an individualized remedy 
                                                            
50 Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 44, at 134 (noting that “[for much of the nation's history, state common law 
provided victims with a right of action that ... could eventually result in the vindication of their constitutional rights” 
by treating the constitutional violation as “invalidat[ing] any authority conferred by federal law” 
51 James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government 
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1868 (2010); see also Bowden v. Morris, 3 F. Cas. 
1032, 1032 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1876) (No. 1,715) (“Except in cases where property is taxed, or otherwise taken for public 
purposes [government cannot deprive a person of rights without] “suit in a court of justice.”). 
52 Pfander & Hunt, supra note 51, at 1867 (noting that “reimbursement of a well-founded claim [was viewed] more 
as a matter of right than as a matter of legislative grace”). 
53 Kian, supra note 48, at 134. 
54 Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, supra note 37, at 101 
55 Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 422-29, 450-
51 (1987) [hereinafter “Woolhandler, Patterns”].  
56 See, e.g., Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962) (disallowing ejectment action against federal officer to 
recover real property in the absence of a claim that the officer's conduct violated the Constitution); Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-88 (1949) (barring claim against federal officer to enjoin 
breach of contract). 
57 Woolhandler, Patterns, supra note 55, at 452 (“[T]he change in the types of property that increasingly became the 
subject of government regulation may have been partly responsible for the modern dichotomy between damages and 
injunctive relief.”). 
58 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)); Stephen N. 
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 913(1987) (exploring “the revolutionary character of the decision inherent in the Federal Rules 
to make equity procedure available for all cases”). 
 11 
(e.g., money, evidentiary suppression, or release). Each also has roots in the late nineteenth-
century or early twentieth century, quickly fell into desuetude, and then did not see vigorous 
usage until the 1960s.59 Together, they comprised the remedial side of the Warren Court’s 
aggressive campaign to install the Bill of Rights and rein in states’ and localities’ police, 
prosecutors, prison officials, and petty bureaucrats.  
 
 The Court’s reconstruction of constitutional remedies had three prongs. First, in 1961 the 
Court in Monroe v. Pape revived a civil damages remedy enacted as part of the Reconstruction-
era Ku Klux Klan Act,60 for use against civil action for damages, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against state 
actors that violated the Constitution.61 Until this date, §1983 had not been an effectual response 
to unconstitutional state action because courts had required that plaintiffs show state law 
authorization for an alleged unconstitutional act.62 In the 65 years of the statute’s first enactment, 
one study found only nineteen instances in which §1983 had resulted in a reported decision.63 
When courts did consider its effect, federal judges typically failed to impose any effectual 
remedial consequences.64 After Monroe, the discrete, discretionary, and dispersed actions of state 
and municipal front-line officials became plausible subjects of judicial review for constitutional 
compliance. Also in the forty years after Monroe, the volume of constitutional damages actions 
filed pursuant to § 1983 increased by two orders of magnitude.65 That growth was abetted by the 
Court’s 1978 decision to expanded government tort liability by permitting suits against 
municipalities where “the action is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes” a law 
or policy.66  
 
Supplementing the Court’s novel regulation of state front-line officials was a new 
willingness to review the constitutionality of discretionary decisions by federal officials 
interacting with citizens. Congress had enacted no civil action for constitutional torts actions 
against federal officials parallel to § 1983. Nevertheless, the Court in 1971 inferred a damage 
remedy directly from the Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.67 Notably Bivens concerned the Fourth Amendment rights of a putative 
drug dealer during an FBI raid on his home68—the same kind of routine, hard-to-observe official 
exercise of discretion that § 1983 also distinctly addressed. While the Supreme Court evinces 
                                                            
59 Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1533 (1972) 
(commenting almost contemporaneously on the expansion in remedial resources in the individual rights context in 
this era). 
60 Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000)). 
61 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).  
62 Id. (rejecting the then-dominant position that 42 U.S.C. §1983 allowed suit only when the alleged constitutional 
violation was authorized by state law). Also, constitutional rights were often narrowly defined.  
63 Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1486 n.4. (1969). 
64 See, e.g., Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283, 290 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891) (describing statute as purely “declaratory,” 
creating no new rights or modes of proceeding).  
65 David C. Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1199, 1208 (noting that the number of nonprisoner civil rights suits increased from 150 in 1961 to 42,354 in 
1998).  
66 Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (ruling on a policy that compelled pregnant 
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence).  
67 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (recognizing cause of action for damages under Fourth Amendment). 
68 For details about Webster Bivens and the search challenged in that case, see James E. Pfander, The Story of 
Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 275-
77 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 2009). 
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persistent leeriness of expanding the availability of damages actions against federal officials in 
new contexts,69 the Bivens remedy remains a hardy perennial in the lower courts. Recent 
empirical work suggests that Bivens actions succeed between 17% and 34% of the time.70  
 
 The second expansion of constitutional remedies also occurred in 1961, when the Court 
in Mapp v. Ohio expanded the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule remedy that had, until then, 
only availed defendants in federal courts trials71 to also cover prosecutions in state courts.72 
Then, as now, it was state officials, not federal officials, who were tasked with the lion’s share of 
policing. Incorporation of the exclusionary rule suddenly meant that that Court’s 1949 
incorporation of Fourth Amendment rights in Wolf v. Colorado suddenly had practical effect 
where previously it has been, in effect, a dead letter.73 Five years after imposing the exclusionary 
rule against the states in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court extended the exclusionary 
rule to the Fifth Amendment’s rule against coerced testimony. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court 
installed a prophylactic regime of oral warnings in the police interrogation context with 
enforcement again flowing through an exclusionary rule over a patchwork of state practices that 
sometimes included warnings, and sometimes did not.74  
 
Exclusionary rules in these contexts do not, strictly speaking, remedy the privacy, 
dignity, and security harms that the relevant constitutional provisions seek to prevent, but rather 
have been explained as vehicles for deterrence.75 To that extent, my terminology of remedies is 
imprecise. Nevertheless, not all remedies place litigants precisely in the position they would have 
been in absent a wrong occurring.76 Exclusion is fairly classed as a remedy to the extent it is 
sought by a putatively injured party, and purports to eliminate an advantage that the state as 
counterparty possesses as a consequence of the constitutional wrong.   
 
Finally—and roughly contemporaneously with these developments in constitutional tort 
law and the exclusionary rule—the mid-century Court also breathed new life into the writ of 
habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for constitutional criminal procedure violations.77 For 
almost the first century of the Republic, the habeas writ was not available as a postconviction 
                                                            
69 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 44, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a good deal more circumspect” 
in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts). 
70 Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual 
Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842-46 (2010). 
71 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914) (unanimously applying the exclusionary rule in federal 
prosecutions). 
72 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (describing the exclusionary rule as “part and parcel” of the Fourth 
Amendment). The Court has subsequently repudiated this account of the exclusionary rule. United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).  
73 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states). Even when 
the U.S. Supreme Court itself explicitly recommended a federal prosecution for criminal trespass against local 
officials who had violated the incorporated Fourth Amendment, no remedy was to be had. There was no 
investigation. The Department failed even to open a file on the matter. Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: 
The Court That Cried "Wolf", 77 MISS. L.J. 467, 492-97 (2007) (discussing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 
(1954), in which that happened). 
74 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1966).  
75 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 796 (1994). 
76 Consider the persistent refusal of courts to give consequential damages for contract violations. 
77 Not until 1867 did Congress expand the writ to encompass review of state convictions. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 
9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
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remedy.78 It was employed indeed on rare occasions as a preemptive shield against criminal 
prosecution.79 Only in 1867 did Congress expand the writ to encompass review of state 
convictions.80 The 1867 statute, though, was not followed by a expansion in habeas challenges. It 
was not until a series of four decisions starting in 1953 with Brown v. Allen81 that procedural 
constraints on habeas review withered.82 In the following four decades, the volume of habeas 
litigation lodged by state prisoners engorged even more dramatically than § 1983 filings.83  
 
It is important to reiterate here that the three remedies identified here do not cover the 
waterfront of potential judicial mechanisms for enforcing the Constitution. Indeed, an important 
element of Part II’s argument will focus on how exceptions to the fault rule create incentives 
over the kind of constitutional suits litigants file. To anticipate that discussion, it is worth noting 
here the two most important alternatives to damages, exclusion, and habeas relief as vehicles for 
individuals to secure some judicial response for a constitutional wrong.  
 
First, at least since the 1907 decision in Ex Parte Young, federal courts have issued 
injunctions against state officials barring them from civil or criminal enforcement of a state law 
when the action on the ground that enforcement will violate the constitutional rights of the 
plaintiff.84 Today, plaintiffs invoking Young can allege an ongoing violation of federal law and 
obtain prospective relief without regard to state sovereign immunity. 85  Second, in 1934, 
Congress enacted a federal Declaratory Judgment Act86 pursuant to which plaintiffs could secure 
relief against state actors even when an injunction could not be obtained.87 Injunctive or 
declaratory relief is of limited utility in many instances. When a constitutional violation is 
inflicted without prior notice, and where the damage immediately realized—as is often the case 
when police, prosecutors, and bureaucrats are concerned—then neither an injunction nor a 
declaratory judgment will be of great use. In such cases, the vindication of individual 
                                                            
78 Cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (not extending habeas to post-conviction review). 
79 See, e.g., Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). 
80 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86. 
81 44 U.S. 443 (1953).  
82 NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 56-57 (2011) (describing causes and size of shift in postconviction habeas filings).  
83 Id. at 60. The rise in habeas filings is likely a consequence of the dramatic expansion in incarceration that 
characterizes federal and state criminal justice policy since the beginning of the 1970s. See generally 
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 12-15 (2006). The rise of mass incarceration also led 
to a sharp rise in the volume of prisoner litigation. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 
1578-87 (2003) (documenting evidence). 
84 The pivotal case is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (authorizing injunction against unconstitutional state 
action absent specific statutory authorization for that remedy), but federal courts issued injunctions against 
unconstitutional state action long before Young, see Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE 
L.J.1, 19 n.70 (1924) (collecting cases dating from 1838). 
85 Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011); accord Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 1645 (2002). Congress, however, can foreclose a Young injunctive remedy by 
enacting a sufficiently specific statutory scheme. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996). 
Further, Young cannot be used to obtain funds from a state’s treasury, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 
(1974), or order specific performance of a State's contract, In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887). 
86 Act of June 14, 1934, c. 512, 48 Stat. 955. 
87 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that declaratory relief was available even though the 
threatened state criminal prosecution could not be enjoined). For an argument that the gap between injunctive and 
declaratory relief is elusive, see Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 
1095 (2014). 
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constitutional rights will generally hinge on whether an individual litigant can avail themselves 
of a constitutional tort action, a suppression motion, or a postconviction remedy. Absent these 
tools, a constitutional violation will have no legal or practical consequence.  
 
B. Fault in Constitutional Tort Law 
 
But when do plaintiffs have access to remedies such as damages, suppression, or habeas 
relief? Since the mid-1970s, the Court has rationed the availability of each of these three 
remedies by installing a threshold requirement that individual rights claimants must typically 
demonstrate that an offending state official not only violated the Constitution, but did so in an 
especially flagrant and obvious way. That is, it is often no longer sufficient to allege a violation 
of the Constitution. It is also necessary to allege that the violation of the Constitution was 
especially clear and unambiguous so as to warrant the expense of trial and the imposition of 
liability. The Court has framed this threshold requirement as one of “fault” or “culpability.”88 
Because the latter term can be used to mark out the distinctive aspect of conduct warranting 
criminal, but not civil penalties,89 I borrow only the Court’s usage of “fault.” To emphasize, I use 
that term solely to identify conduct in which the constitutional violation is unambiguously clear 
ex ante, and not to gesture toward an inchoate notion of moral blameworthiness.  
 
The move toward fault is clearest in the constitutional tort context, and it is there I start. 
Within this doctrinal domain, fault is a familiar element qualified immunity doctrine, but also 
plays a central regulative role in municipal liability doctrine, and even in the substantive law 
defining some of the constitutional torts most commonly enforced through § 1983 and Bivens 
actions. But conventional accounts of this doctrine miss two points that I stress in the following 
account of qualified immunity and cognate fault rules in constitutional tort law. First, the fault 
role stands on no legislative foundation, but is rather a function of relatively freewheeling 
judicial policy-making discretion. Second, although notionally explained as a way of making 
officials’ tasks easier, the fault rule in constitutional tort serves also to mitigate pressure upon 
judicial effort and resources.  
 
1. Fault as the Operative Principle of Qualified Immunity  
 
No federal statute creates immunity from tort liability in officer suits pursuant to § 1983 
or Bivens. Rather, official immunity is the Justices’ creation. This is most clearly evident in the 
incremental fashion it has emerged, a pathway that bears the clear fingerprints of conscious 
judicial policy-making, rather than any fidelity to legislative intent. 90  Initially, qualified 
immunity was modest in theory and effect. The Court in the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray first 
granted immunity to officers acting pursuant to a state statute later held unconstitutional on the 
ground that such immunity was a “settled principle of law” Congress had not meant to abolish 
                                                            
88 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997) (using the terms “fault” and 
“culpability” almost interchangeably); see also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).  
89 Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 94 (2008) (noting 
that “moral culpability” characterizes criminal conduct, but not conduct to which civil penalties attach).  
90 See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233-61 (2006) (providing a 
chronological account of the development of immunity doctrines) (.  
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when enacting the Ku Klux Klan Act. 91  Both Pierson’s holding and its reasoning were 
circumscribed. First, only official actions taken “in good faith,” and, with respect to police, on 
the basis of “probable cause” secured an exception from liability.92 That is, the ex ante existence 
of some positive legal authority for an official act seemed key to immunity. Second, the Court 
recognized only such immunity as existed at common law, and then only because it presumed 
that Congress did not lightly unsettle “solidly established” common law principles.93 Legislative 
intent, therefore, was the touchstone of Pierson’s analysis. 
 
Subsequent immunity opinions acknowledged Pierson’s foundation in background tort 
rules defeasible only by clear congressional statement.94 But the Court’s later expansions of 
qualified immunity rapidly came unmoored from Pierson’s historical anchorage, and instead 
gained momentum from the express invocation of policy considerations. The result was a switch 
in immunity’s breadth: Where Pierson intimated that immunity availed if the official could point 
to the existence of a positive source of plausible authority for a challenged act, later cases took as 
a touchstone the absence of a prohibitory source of law as a touchstone. This pivot dramatically 
engorged immunity’s reach, albeit without any clear normative justification from the Court.  
 
In 1975, the Court in Wood v. Strickland began to modify the theoretical foundations, if 
not the scope, of immunity. Such immunity, explained the Wood Court, applied so long as 
officers acted good faith without malicious intent, and neither reasonably know, nor reasonably 
should have known, of its illegality.95 Wood did not move far from Pierson’s focus on the 
existence of positive legal authority. Yet rather than locating its immunity rule in the common 
law, the Court looked directly to “strong public-policy” considerations for its justification.96 In 
particular, the Wood Court conjured the concern that “even the most conscientious … 
decisionmaker [would be deterred] from exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and 
in a manner best serving the long-term interest of the [state] school and the students.”97  
 
Seven years later, the Court invoked the same deterrence-related policy concern, but in so 
doing expanded the substantive reach of qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court 
invoked again deterrence-related public policy considerations, but abandoned Wood’s subjective 
good-faith requirement.98 The Harlow Court instead shielded officials from liability unless their 
conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”99 That is, immunity would attach in the absence of a clear 
                                                            
91 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (noting that “Congress would have specifically so provided had it 
wished to abolish” qualified immunity for police officers); accord Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951). 
92 386 U.S. at 555. 
93 Id. at 553-54. 
94 Hence, the Court has relied on common law principles to extend absolute immunity to prosecutors, see Imbler v. 
Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976), and also to permit punitive damages see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 
(1983). 
95 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). 
96 Id. at 318; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978) (again relying on “considerations of public policy” to 
delimit qualified immunity). For an earlier recognition of the public policy foundations of qualified immunity 
doctrine, see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). 
97 Wood, 420 U.S. at 319-20; id. at 321 (“[T]here must be a degree of immunity if the work of the [state institution] 
is to go forward …”). 
98 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
99 Id.; see also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (anticipating that rule).  
 16 
prohibition—rather than (as in Pierson) in the presence of a clear authorization. In a subsequent 
case, the Court further refined the Harlow test by insisting that it would be applied to allegations 
in the most “particularized” sense possible, such the illegality of an alleged violation must be 
starkly “apparent.”100 Today, the Court characterizes qualified immunity as protecting “all but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” and not merely those who (as 
in Pierson) reasonably rely on the constitutionality of a prior statutory enactment.101 As far as 
money damages are concerned, the Constitution is a hazard only for the blunderer and the 
fool.102 
 
In comparison to its antecedent in Pierson, the current iteration of qualified immunity has 
two important qualities. First, since Wood, the Court has made no pretense of mining the 
common law or legislative intent for direction, but has engaged in naked policy-making. The 
demand for particularity, for example, is grounded solely on first-order consequentialist analysis 
of tort’s feedback effect on official action.103 Second, notwithstanding the pragmatic foundation 
of the doctrine, the proffered justifications for qualified immunity do not explain its actual scope. 
The Court has repeatedly expressed alarm about tort’s potential chilling effect on official 
action.104 But the Court has never explained how that overdeterrence rationale motivates the 
move from Pierson’s demand for positive law to Harlow’s search for a clear prohibition. Worse, 
the Court has never offered any empirical evidence that overdeterrence is in fact a problem. 
Recent empirical work on indemnification of tort actions in the policing context demonstrates 
that, at least in that context, indemnification is “virtually always” available,105 even when the 
officer in question has violated both the Constitution and relevant criminal law.106 Indeed, many 
jurisdictions do not even have a mechanism to transmit information gained through lawsuits to 
police departments that employ serial rights offenders.107 Although this data has only become 
available recently, earlier studies reached substantially parallel results.108 This data suggests that 
it has never been the case that individual officials are likely to pay from their own pockets. This 
                                                            
100 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); accord Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). 
The effect of qualified immunity will therefore be greatest when the Court relies on standards rather than rules. 
Application of the former “rarely” requires “a new rule,” United States v. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107-08 (2013), 
in a way that would satisfy Anderson’s particularly requirement.  
101 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malloy v. Riggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1985)). 
102 Sounding an even more alarmist note, Chen argues that the Court has conflated qualified immunity with absolute 
immunity, Chen, supra note 90, at 275. 
103 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 (“An immunity that has as many variants as there are modes of official action and 
types of rights would not give conscientious officials that assurance of protection that it is the object of the doctrine 
to provide.”). The Anderson Court does not cite or discuss any common law antecedents for its rule. 
104 See supra text accompanying note 97.  
105 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (“Between 2006 and 2011, in 
forty-four of the country's largest jurisdictions, officers financially contributed to settlements and judgments in just 
.41% of the approximately 9225 civil rights damages actions resolved in plaintiffs' favor, and their contributions 
amounted to just .02% of the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and states in these cases.”). 
106 Id. at 923-95 
107 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1028-30 (2010) (finding that law enforcement agencies rarely gather and 
analyze information from lawsuits brought against them and their officers 
108 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding no cases in which “an individual official had borne the cost of an adverse 
constitutional tort judgment”); Lant B. Davis et al., Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-12 
(1979) (reporting government defense and indemnification of police officers in Connecticut). 
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means not only that the Court’s overdeterrence argument based on the direct effect of money 
damages is not persuasive as a matter of fact.109 It also means that the central element of the 
qualified immunity edifice was one asserted without foundation by the government, and accepted 
on the basis of mere governmental ipse dixit by the Court. The Court has built a comprehensive, 
transubstantive doctrinal framework for limiting constitutional remedies without ever asking 
whether its basic empirical predicate held true. This is, to say the least, a noteworthy omission 
that raises the question whether something other than (imaginary) overdeterrence concerns are at 
play.  
 
Even if the reason the Court gives for its currently robust iteration of qualified immunity 
fails, there is an obvious alternative. Qualified immunity is “‘an immunity from suit rather than a 
mere defense to liability.’”110 It is designed to “permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without 
resort to trial.”111 So powerful is this preference for pretrial resolution of constitutional tort 
claims that the Court has crafted an atextual exception to the general prohibition on interlocutory 
appeals when qualified immunity is denied.112 Qualified immunity therefore does not merely 
economize on the litigation expenses of public officials, it also rations out judicial resources with 
increasing care.113 And whereas the overdeterrence-related justification for qualified immunity 
rests on elusive, and perhaps false, empirical supposition, the judicial economy justification for 
qualified immunity is both immediately clear and obviously true.  
 
2. Fault’s Spillovers from Constitutional Tort Doctrine  
 
The fault rule embedded in today’s qualified immunity law has leaked from its original 
locus in constitutional tort doctrine into three contexts where the Court’s overdeterrence concern 
plainly does not apply. This spillovers further undermine the conclusion that deterrence concerns 
explain the domain of tort-related fault.  
 
First, at least formally the protections of qualified immunity does not apply to tort actions 
against municipalities.114 Nevertheless, current doctrine is calibrated so as to require a showing 
that a municipal defendant not only violated a constitutional rule, but affirmatively chose to 
ignore a clear constitutional prohibition. In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, the Court 
stated, without explanation or elaboration, that “rigorous standards of culpability and causation 
must be applied to municipal liability cases.”115 This demand has had the greatest practical force 
in cases alleging municipal liability based on improper training or supervision. Such liability can 
be established only by showing a constitutional deficiency was “so obvious, and the inadequacy 
so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights” that policymakers could be said to be 
                                                            
109 Qualified immunity might be defended based on officials’ risk aversion based on the prospect of averse career 
consequences, selection effects, and the distribution of political costs. Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 14, at 
267-68. But even advocates of these arguments concede that they rest on “fundamentally speculative” empirical 
grounds. Id. at 268.  
110 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
111 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); accord Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1996). 
112 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (extending government officers a right to interlocutory appellate 
review of decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense). 
113 It is worth noting that the Court has not required state courts to follow Mitchell’s exception from the rule against 
interlocutory appeals. See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 913 (1997).  
114 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1980). 
115 520 U.S. 397, 390 (1989) (emphasis added).  
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“deliberately indifferent.”116 That is, it extended the fault role (understood once more not as a 
demand for blameworthiness but rather a gross form of constitutional error) to facilitate 
threshold dismissal. 
 
For example, rejecting a recent suit challenging repeated prosecutorial misconduct in 
New Orleans, the Court set aside a jury finding of liability because the plaintiff had failed to 
show “[p]olicymakers’ ‘continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has 
failed to prevent tortious conduct,” notwithstanding a string of cases in which state courts had 
reversed convictions based on the state’s misconduct.117 As the dissent noted, the trial record in 
that case evinced “the conceded, long-concealed prosecutorial transgressions were neither 
isolated nor atypical.”118 In practice, this ruling means that moving a municipal liability claim 
from the pretrial stage to plenary courtroom proceeding requires strong threshold evidence of a 
persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct amounting to intentional violation of the 
Constitution—evidence that, in the majority of cases--that will in practice be unavailable to most 
plaintiffs without discovery. 
 
Notwithstanding its rigorous enforcement of the fault rule in the municipal liability 
context, the Court has not explained why there is a need to avoid overdeterrence in such cases. 
Unlike individual officials, municipalities are comparatively well placed to internalized both the 
costs and benefits of constitutional violations, and thus not err on the side of excessive 
precaution.119 The current doctrine’s structure, by contrast, means that municipal entities will 
systematically fail to internalize the costs of unconstitutional actions. At the very least, there is 
some reason to think that municipal liability should be more expansively available than 
individual officer liability if the focal concern is ovedeterrence.120 The Court, in short, has not 
even tried to explain—and may not be able to explain—its extension of fault from the individual 
to the municipal liability context based on deterrence concerns. That extension, however, may 
alternatively fit an account focused on the need to titrate carefully judicial resources in a world 
where towns and cities routinely and persistently violate the Constitution.  
 
Second, the Court has extended an analog fault rule from qualified immunity to 
challenges to unconstitutional taxes. Ex post remedies for an invalid tax are available only when 
“legislators would have good reason to suppose that enactment of the … tax would … violate 
their oath to uphold the United States Constitution.”121 In practice, this is one of a series of 
impediments that complicate challenges to unconstitutional taxes, rendering may such challenges 
                                                            
116 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); see also St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124-27 (1988) 
(establishing a narrow definition of official policymakers for §1983 purposes). 
117 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) 
118 Id. at 1370. 
119 Peter Schuck has argued that qualified immunity is warranted because officials do not internalize the upside gains 
from legally risky actions, and hence should not be require to internalize their costs in order to avoid asymmetries in 
their incentive structures. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 59-
81 (1983); accord Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 14, at 265-70. 
120 For a development of this point, see Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 
DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 646 (1999). 
121 Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (O’Connor, J., plurality op.). 
 19 
futile.122 It is salient because it extends the same fault-based framework familiar from qualified 
immunity to a context in which concerns about overdeterrence are, at minimum, weak. 
Legislators responsible for taxation have staff, including lawyers, capable of sophisticated legal 
and constitutional analysis. It might be thought that doctrinal rules should incentive a high 
degree of care among such legislators, rather than subsidizing carelessness. If the justification for 
a fault-based safe harbor is the husbanding of judicial interests, by contrast, this extension of 
qualified immunity may seem more sensible.  
 
Third, starting in the early 1980s, the Court has fashioned a set of rules to limit 
constitutional tort actions for state deprivations of liberty and property interests in the absence of 
intentional or systemic state actions.123 In 1981, the Court imposed an exhaustion rule for tort 
suits based on a state official’s discretionary act depriving a person of property—a charge likely 
to most common in the policing and incarceration contexts.124 In the 1986 Daniels v. Williams 
decision, for example, the Court held that merely negligent acts do not amount to a deprivation 
under Due Process Clause. 125  Like qualified immunity doctrine, Daniels and the related 
exhaustion rule require an allegation that a defendant official has traduced an especially obvious 
and unambiguous constitutional rule to move past a threshold motion to dismiss to get to trial 
and potential liability. Mere negligence that extinguishes a life or destroys property yields no 
cause for remediation. 126  That rule, though, only apply to “random and unauthorized” 
deprivations of liberty or property, which cannot be challenged unless and until state remedies 
have been exhausted, and not in challenges to systematic policies that result in constitutional 
deprivations.127 That is, they apply precisely when the volume of suits demanding relief is likely 
to be greatest.  
 
This is also one of the rare instances in which one need not guess at the Court’s attention 
to its own institutional concerns—they are explicit and on the surface of the opinions. The Court 
has repeatedly announced that § 1983 should not become “font of tort law to be superimposed 
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.”128 The concern with federal 
caseload management—even at the cost of allowing a tranche of constitutional violations to pass 
                                                            
122 Amy Silverstein, The Rewards and Frustrations of Successful Constitutional Challenges to State Taxes, 87 J. 
TAX. 102, 102 (1997) (noting that “success on the merits does not always result in a refund of the unconstitutional 
taxes”). 
123 For a summary of this jurisprudence, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 345-52 (1993). 
124 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (holding that no due process deprivation has occurred if State 
provides adequate postdeprivation process to remedy random, unauthorized acts of state officers), overruled in part 
by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (extending Parratt’s 
exhaustion principle to intentional torts). 
125 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). 
126 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998) )” We have accordingly rejected the lowest 
common denominator of customary tort liability as any mark of sufficiently shocking conduct, and have held that 
the Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is 
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”) 
127 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137-38 (1990) (holding that Parratt does not apply when the deprivation was 
foreseeable and authorized—as distinct from random and unauthorized—and when predeprivation process would 
have been feasible); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1982) (holding that 
postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where deprivation is caused by established state procedures). 
128 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Fallon, supra note 123, at 339 (noting and discussing repeated 
invocation of this concern). To be sure, there is also a federalism concern at work here. 
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without any effectual remedy, at least from a federal court—is visible on the surface. Moreover, 
it is presented without any effort to explain why the class of plaintiffs thereby deprived of a 
remedy are otherwise undeserving.  
 
Fault’s penumbral extensions in the constitutional tort context to municipal liability suits, 
challenges to unconstitutional state tax, and random, unauthorized liberty or property 
deprivations are not well explained by the motives evinced in Harlow and subsequent qualified 
immunity cases. They are, by contrast, well fitted to the goal of rationing valuable judicial 
resources. They hence provide some reason to posit the institutional concerns of an independent 
judiciary as having causal effect.  
 
C. Fault and the Exclusionary Rule  
 
Fault has also leaked from the constitutional tort context to the exclusionary rule context 
in the Fourth Amendment context and, increasingly, in the Fifth Amendment context. The 
trajectory of fault as a threshold constraint on suppression remedy evinces several commonalities 
with analog doctrine in the constitutional tort context. First, while initially glossed as a remedy 
for overdeterrence, its applications quickly outpaced that justification. Second, it too has leaked 
into the substance of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, as in the constitutional tort context, there is 
some threshold circumstantial evidence that judicial interests, rather than officials’ interests, 
better explain the doctrine’s development.  
 
Unlike the issuance of damages pursuant to § 1983, the exercise of judicial power that 
comprises the exclusionary rule lacks a clear statutory foundation. Moreover, since 1974, when 
the Court characterized it as a discretionary mode of Fourth Amendment enforcement, its 
constitutional basis has been at least contestable.129 For a decade thereafter, the Mapp rule 
nevertheless endured roughly unscathed. Its doctrinal retrenchment began not at a litigant’s 
behest, but at the Court’s. It was the Court that sua sponte ordered reargument in 1983 in Illinois 
v. Gates on the question whether Mapp should be modified “not to require the exclusion of 
evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure was consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.”130 Although the Court did not reach this issue in Gates, Justice White’s 
concurrence invoked the recently decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald 131  opinion as a guide to 
narrowing Mapp.132 Beyond touting the benefits of a fault-based safe harbor for effective law 
enforcement, Justice White also drew attention to the rule’s payoff to the judiciary in terms of a 
“reduction in the number of cases which will require elongated considerations of the probable 
cause question.”133 Concerns of judicial economy, in short, were plainly in view from even 
before the fault rule was installed into the structure of exclusionary rule jurisprudence.  
 
A year later, Justice White would write for the Court in United States v. Leon and fashion 
a “good-faith” exception for searches in reliance upon warrants not supported by probable 
                                                            
129  See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule was not 
constitutionally required) 
130 Petr’s Br. For Reargument at i, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (No. 81-430) (citations omitted), available at 1983 
WL 482675. 
131 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
132 Gates, 462 U.S. at 267 (White, concurring). 
133 Id.  
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cause.134 The Leon Court once more cited qualified immunity precedent, intimating thereby that 
the exclusionary rule would not apply absent intentional or recklessly negligent action.135 
Consistent with these citations, Leon then deployed the concern with excess deterrence familiar 
from Harlow, asserting that a magistrate who issued a warrant based on an erroneous probable 
cause determination lacked any “stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions” and 
consequently would not be affected by subsequent suppression.136 Completing the circle, Justice 
Stevens would later observe that the Leon standard would in turn influence the Court’s approach 
to the level of specificity at which a qualified immunity analysis would be pitched.137  
 
The Leon exception was at first limited to cases in which the issuing magistrate had erred, 
and an officer had reasonably relied on her decision. Subsequent cases extended Leon to cases 
where police officers erred by relied on subsequently invalidated criminal statutes138 or later-
overruled Supreme Court precedent,139 and also where a warrants issued as a result of errors by a 
court administrator140 or an administrator within the police department itself.141 In recent cases, 
the Court has come close to generalizing Leon’s germ into a generally applicable barrier to 
suppression on Fourth Amendment ground absent “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct” or “recurring or systematic negligence.142 A deterrence-based line reasoning in the 
context of policing and criminal trials has led the Court to roughly the same fault threshold 
gatekeeping rule as the “policy” considerations invoked in the distinct constitutional tort 
context.143 Just as in the tort context,144 moreover, a fault-based gatekeeping rule for suppression 
                                                            
134 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984). 
135 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 & n.23; see also Laurin, Trawling, supra note 43, at 703-04 (discussing doctrinal 
migration in Leon).  
136 Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (“Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial 
officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot 
be expected significantly to deter them.”); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246 (2012) 
(exploring Leon’s deterrence-based logic). 
137 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 659 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the migration of Leon’s 
“double standard” to the qualified immunity context. 
138 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987). 
139 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). 
140 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995). 
141 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (stating that “[w]hen the 
police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, [then the] the 
deterrent value of exclusion [is] … strong”).  
142 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. Herring’s formulation was anticipated by Franks v. Delaware, which held that 
criminal defendants could invalidate a warrant based on flaws in the underlying affidavits only in cases of 
“deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard of the truth.” 438 U.S. 154, 165-71 (1978).  
143 The analogy between the two lines of cases was anticipated in Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for 
Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638-40 (1982), which argues that both 
exclusion of evidence and officer liability for Fourth Amendment violations risk overdeterrence of legitimate law 
enforcement activity). Although this deterrence argument is not the object of my analysis here, it is worth noting a 
certain confusion in the version Posner offers. Posner’s analysis assumes that there is a social welfare function that 
assigns no particular value to constitutional rights. But it is not clear why this should be so: To the contrary, one way 
of understanding a constitution is as a statement of the particular forms of human welfare that are of special concern 
to the polity. To assign no particular weight to constitutional violations, as Posner’s analysis does, is to fail to apply 
the salient social welfare function for our society. The verbal formulations of the concern differs, although the 
substantive concern is identical: In the tort context, the Court expresses concerns about deterring beneficial action; 
in the exclusionary rule context, the Court finds no need to deter unconstitutional actions.  
144 Cf. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the 
Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 53 (1989) (noting that qualified immunity often leaves 
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creates a category of cases in which a person has neither an ex ante opportunity to challenge a 
government action, nor any ex post remedy for a constitutional violation.145  
 
One other extension of Leon merits elaboration here. The Court’s focus on 
overdeterrence suggests that its fault gatekeeping rule should not be extended to intentional 
Fourth Amendment violations or the substance of Fourth Amendment law. As in the 
constitutional tort context, however, fault has seeped out from the domain in which its notional 
deterrence-related justifications apply to domains in which its justification does not obtain. In 
Hudson v. Michigan, the Court held that the exclusionary rule inapplicable to violations of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule146 for warrant executing on the ground that the interests protected by 
the knock-and-announce rule were causally unrelated to the likelihood that evidence would be 
discovered.147 In addition to leaning on the (obviously flawed) logic that suppression would fail 
to create an incentive for police to comply with a constitutionally compelled rule, the Hudson 
Court fell back on the assertion that the “increasing professionalism of police forces” meant 
exclusion was no longer necessary.148 While notionally framed in deterrence terms, the force of 
this argument is hard to discern: For even if police are professionalized, this does not mean that 
they will necessarily follow a constitutional rule that can by law be violated without 
consequences. To the contrary, as David Sklansky has noted, when California amended its state 
constitution to provide that garbage searches were unconstitutional but that no exclusionary rule 
applied, police were “trained to ignore” that constitutional rule, and instead conduct illegal 
garbage searches. 149  Professionalism hence simply increased the alacrity with which 
unconstitutional practices spread in the absence of likely remediation. To assume, as the Hudson 
Court seems to, that professionalism correlates with diminished rates of constitutional violation 
is not obviously justified. 
 
In 2015, the Court extended the fault rule from the remedies context to the substantive 
law of the Fourth Amendment, tracking the remedies-to-substance spillover observed in 
constitutional tort law.150 Again, the deterrence rational for this migration is hard to discern. In 
Heien v. North Carolina, the Court (over a lone dissent from Justice Sotomayor) held that a 
police state based on an erroneous police belief that a criminal law had been violated did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment provided that the officer’s “not … perfect” grasp of the law was 
“reasonable.”151 Heien is notable because it extends Leon’s logic to the substance of the Fourth 
Amendment. To the extent that logic endeavors to map the limits of deterrence, Heien’s appeal is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
“an official’s conduct … governed by the subconstitutional immunity standard … and without a clear guide for 
future conduct”).  
145 See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (noting that “the Leon majority has 
withdrawn that remedy in a class of cases for which no other remedy is available”). As a practical matter, criminal 
defendants will have no cost-effective damages remedy for knock-and-announce violations and many other searches 
that generate inculpatory evidence.  
146 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32 (1995) (imposing knock-and-announce rule for warrant 
execution). 
147 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). 
148 Id. at 598. 
149 David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 581 & n.70 (2008) (citing 
Calif. Comm'n on Peace Officer Standards & Training, Basic Course Workbook Series: Student Materials, Learning 
Domain #16, Search and Seizure, at 1-10 (1998)). 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 124 to 127. 
151 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (holding that a “reasonable mistake of law” did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
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again elusive: It is not obvious why police officers charged with executing the law should not 
labor under an incentive to become accurately informed about the law, especially when citizens 
work under a parallel obligation.152 The extension of fault in the Fourth Amendment suppression 
remedy context is thus no longer fully explained by the Court’s own deterrence rationale (if it 
was ever so explained). Rather, as with the constitutional tort context, a close study of doctrinal 
development suggests that the Court is the principal architect in this fault rule, and that looming 
large among its motives is an institutional concern with judicial economy.  
 
Moreover, once nested in Fourth Amendment law, the fault rule has proved contagious 
across remedial boundaries within criminal procedure law. Consider the Fifth Amendment 
prophylactic regime of Miranda v. Arizona153 Early cases applying Miranda eschewed any 
notion of fault.154 A fault rule entered Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in litigation over a police 
tactic that involved violating Miranda by failing to give warnings, giving the requisite warnings, 
and then rehearsing the same questions to obtain testimony that had previously been aired. In 
Oregon v. Elstad, the Court held that a second statement obtained after warnings could be 
admitted even if it was arguably the product of a first unwarned statement.155 Confronted by a 
deliberate strategy of using unwarned questioning to inform Mirandized interrogation in 
Missouri v. Seibert, however, the Court fragmented, with a plurality adopting an approach that 
purported to focus solely on the efficacy of any warning eventually delivered.156 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, however, focused on the intentional quality of the Miranda violation, 
importing a notion of fault (albeit not the unreasonable fault that characterizes other remedial 
domains).157 Subsequently, lower courts have looked to officers’ intentions to analyze Miranda 
violations in the two-stage interrogation context.158 Hence, the operative Fifth Amendment 
                                                            
152 Mistakes of law occur in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context and are not given exculpating 
significance there. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 531-32 (1987) (Petitioner did not invoke Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel when he agreed to speak to police, but not to give a written statement without a lawyer 
present.); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-26 (1986) (finding affirmative police misrepresentations about 
availability of defendant’s lawyer did not undermine waiver of Fifth Amendment rights). The Court has also taken a 
pitiless view of habeas petitioners’ filing errors, even when those errors are made in reliance upon a judge’s 
directions. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007). It is, to be sure, possible to imagine justifications for 
treating officials’ and citizens’ errors asymmetrically. Yet the repeated character of officials’ encounters with the 
law, the distribution of educational and other epistemic resources, and the simple possibility of training—with the 
concomitant risk of moral hazard from judicial exculpation of official error—all these list against the sort of 
unilateral mercy that the Court has evinced.  
153 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1966). Miranda requires the delivery of four warnings and the 
securing of a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights prior to custodial interrogation. Id. The failure to give the warnings, 
moreover, does not necessarily lead to exclusion even absent fault. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 
224-26 (1971) (allowing the use for impeachment purposes of voluntary statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449-51 (1974) (permitting the use of testimony given by third party 
whose identity was derived from a statement obtained in violation of Miranda). Moreover, it is unclear whether 
Miranda is constitutionally compelled. When presented with the question whether Miranda violations can be 
enforced via constitutional tort suits, the Court fragmented. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).  
154 See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).  
155 470 U.S. 298, 306-10 (1985). 
156 Missouri v. Seibert 542 U.S. 600, 604-06 (plurality op. of Souter, J.). 
157 Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting the officer acted in good faith, and 
discussing the plurality's test); United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008) (declining to 
resolve the issue because the statement would be suppressed under any applicable framework); United States v. 
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remedial rule in Seibert’s wake increasingly tracks the fault-based logic of Leon and its progeny 
in sorting for deliberate constitutional violations and disregarding negligent violations. The 
seemingly inexorable spread of fault as a threshold trigger for suppression remedies in criminal 
trials confirms the ascendency of fault as a regulative principle for individualized constitutional 
remedies.  
 
D. Fault in Postconviction Habeas Jurisprudence 
 
The third remedial domain in which fault has come to play a pivotal rationing function is 
postconviction habeas review. Since 1867, the postconviction writ has provided a procedural 
vehicle for state and federal prisoners to challenge their confinement on the ground that there 
was a constitutional error in their initial criminal adjudication. 159  The present law of 
postconviction review is, to say the least, labyrinthine.160 I focus here on advancing two 
relatively limited claims about habeas doctrine. First, a fault rule plays the same gatekeeping 
function in the habeas context as it does in the constitutional tort and the exclusionary rule 
domains. Second, even though postconviction habeas is necessarily a statutory creation, it has 
been the Court that has taken in laboring oar in endowing fault with a regulative function. 
Tracking the etiology of the fault rule in the constitutional tort context, the parallel habeas rule 
has evolved gradually and incrementally through a process of common-law adjudication. And 
third, this regulative function is best explained in terms of judicial economy concerns.161  
 
From its inception, the mid-century reinvigoration of collateral relief from state criminal 
convictions attracted fierce criticism for its psychological and practical toll upon state criminal 
justice systems.162 It was not, however, until 1989 that the Court in Teague v. Lane began to 
carve out a safe harbor for state officials who complied with contemporaneously applicable 
constitutional rules—and correspondingly began to deny relief to litigants who failed to identify 
an especially glaring constitutional error.163 Formally a rule about retroactivity, Teague in fact 
tracked the early versions of fault found in cases such as Pierson164 and Evans.165 By holding 
that habeas petitioners could not obtain relief based on violations of constitutional rules 
announced after their convictions became final,166 it held state officials responsive for extant 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004) (“at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations,” there is a 
“presumptive rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test”). 
159 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86; for a comprehensive history of postconviction 
review, see Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2350-76 (1993). 
160 I have offered a synthesis in Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 531-53.  
161 For earlier account of the primacy of judicial preferences over the shape of habeas, see id. at 523; John H. Blume, 
AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 262 (2006) (“While the Court maintains that the 
scope of the writ is primarily for Congress to determine, it does not, in my view, really believe that to be true. …. 
[It] has assumed a fair share of the responsibility for determining the scope of habeas review, or how much habeas is 
enough.”). 
162 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 441, 452-53 (1963). 
163 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 
164 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); see also supra text accompanying notes 91 to 93. 
165 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995); see also supra text accompanying note 139. 
166 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; Linda Meyer, “Nothing we say matters”: Teague and the New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 423, 425 (1994) (characterizing and criticizing Teague’s holding that “convictions should not be overturned on 
the basis of constitutional violations that state courts could not have known of, let alone avoided, at the time a case 
was tried”). 
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constitutional law, but not its potential expansions. That Teague was inspired by the logic of 
qualified immunity was immediately apparent to sophisticated observers, even if not explicit on 
the face of the decision.167 Just how far the Court would take the analogy would take time to 
surface.  
 
The first doctrinal move moving the fault rule in habeas into lock-step with its cognate 
rules in constitutional tort and evidentiary suppression came a year later, when the Court held 
that state-court convictions would be assessed for Teague novelty against a specific and granular 
version of the precedent, not the general principle of constitutional law embodied by the case.168 
This development paralleled the demand for specificity in constitutional tort law.169 Just as in the 
constitutional tort context, the demand that habeas petitioners identify a specific rule extant at the 
time their convictions became final meant that “any decision, reasonably distinguishable on its 
facts from prior decisions,” could be ranked as an unenforceable new rule, especially since the 
mere fact of “actual disagreement among courts” counting as evidence of reasonable 
disagreement.170  
 
Here, the evolution of fault in postconviction review diverges from its trajectory in the 
constitutional tort and exclusionary rule contexts: Unique to the habeas context is a measure of 
congressional involvement in the form of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA).171 AEDPA imposed a suite of new constraints on postconviction petitions, 
including a new statute of limitation, more stringent rules against seriatim petitions, and a more 
onerous standard of review172 Nevertheless, at least in terms of its key fault rule, AEDPA was 
largely anticipated by judicial developments, and the effect of AEDPA has proved to be largely a 
function of judicial glosses—interpretations that have altered dramatically over time absent any 
congressional updating. The semblance of congressional control, in short, is largely illusory: 
Calibration of the fault rule in habeas jurisprudence has in significant measure fallen within 
judicial discretion.  
 
The primacy of judicial policy discretion in fault’s emergence can be perceived by 
placing AEPDA in a larger context. Prior to AEDPA, Teague deference to state court 
determinations applied solely to pure questions of law, not the mixed questions of law and fact 
that dominate in habeas practice.173 Asked to extend Teague deference prior to AEDPA in 1992, 
the Court splintered in Wright v West, with Justice Thomas’s opinion pressing toward an 
                                                            
167 See Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (1991) (drawing this comparison). 
168 See, e.g., Butler v McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409, 414-15 (1990). It is indicative of conscious borrowing of 
doctrinal innovations from other remedial domains that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Butler opinion cites Leon with 
approval. Butler, 494 US at 414. The convergence of qualified immunity and habeas doctrine is noted in Ann 
Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 635-40 (1993). 
169 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see supra text accompanying note 100. 
170 Meyer, supra note 166, at 442; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 167, at 1761 (citing Butler as an example). 
171 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
172 See Blume, supra note 161, at 270-74 (summarizing AEDPA’s core provisions). 
173 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (stating that mixed questions of fact and law are “subject to 
plenary federal review” on habeas); accord Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 289, 294 (1992) (plurality op. of Thomas, 
J.) (noting validity of Miller after Teague). 
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expansion of Teague securing only two other votes.174 What the Court could not muster a 
majority to install by common-law adjudication, however, Congress was able to push through in 
the heated aftermath to a major domestic terrorism incident.175 Four years after West, Congress 
included in AEDPA stringent standards of review for legal and factual error of state court 
convictions.176 Assuming the state court reached the merits, AEDPA directed that its decision 
could be adjudged on the merits only if “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”177 It 
is worth emphasizing that this is, like qualified immunity, a gatekeeping rule. Habeas petitioners 
who surmount that hurdle still have to establish an independent entitlement to constitutional 
relief.178  
 
As first enacted, AEDPA’s core gatekeeping rule as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
merely accomplished what Justice Thomas exhorted in West. It extinguished most de novo 
review in federal habeas consideration of state criminal convictions in favor of a fault-based 
standard akin to the demand for evidence of an unambiguously unconstitutional action in 
constitutional tort law.179 That fault rule, moreover, applied to not just questions of law but also 
mixed questions of law and fact. As a legislative enactment, therefore, AEDPA merely borrowed 
from previously expressed judicial preferences.  
 
Nor has the fault rule of § 2254(d)(1) remained fixed since its enactment in 1996. Beside 
the absence of formal statutory changes, the Court has incrementally altered its interpretation of 
that provision to the point where relief is available only when a state court violation of 
constitutional rights is, in effect, grossly negligent or intentional. This process of common law 
adjudication has over time aligned the fault rule for habeas with the fault rule for postconviction 
relief and for suppression remedies. This process of shifting legal meaning in the absence of 
statutory change suggests again that the relative strength of the fault rule even under AEDPA has 
been a function of judicial preference rather than the plain meaning of the statutory text.  
 
Section 2254(d)(1) was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2000 case of Terry 
Williams v. Taylor to permit merits consideration of a habeas petitioner’s claim only when “the 
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if 
                                                            
174 West, 505 U.S. at 294 (plurality op. of Thomas J.) (strongly suggesting, without holding that deference should be 
extended to mixed questions of fact and law). 
175 Notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s failure to forge a majority in West, subsequent majority opinions echoed his 
language, rather than the more generous terms of the West concurrences. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 
467 (1993) (stating that federal habeas relief is appropriate only if “reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at 
the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to rule in his favor”) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (“[W]e will not disturb a 
final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state court, at the time the conviction or sentence 
became final, would have acted objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court.”). 
176 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2).  
177 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Factual errors are cognizable only if “unreasonable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The latter, 
provision, however, interacts with other elements of AEPDA in ways that have not yet been fully resolved. Wood v. 
Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010) (noting circuit conflict about how the reasonableness rule in § 2254(d)(2) interacts 
with the presumption in favor of state court factual conclusions in § 2254(e)(1), but declining to resolve it). 
178 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
179 James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2015-16 (1992) (noting that de novo review on habeas was the central target of Justice 
Thomas’s critique). 
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the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially 
indistinguishable facts,” or alternatively, when the state court “identifies the correct governing 
legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of 
the prisoner's case.”180 While this standard might sound demanding, the Williams plurality 
expressly rejected an even harsher circuit court gloss on § 2254(d)(1) to the effect that “a state-
court judgment is ‘unreasonable’ (and hence invalid) only if all reasonable jurists would agree 
that the state court was unreasonable, and granted habeas relief.”181  
 
But over the subsequent fifteen years, Court has recalibrated the meaning of AEDPA 
deference, and adopted that lower-court standard, despite Congress’s failure to amend § 
2254(d)(1).182 By 2011, Justice Kennedy could say on behalf of a supermajority of the Court that 
habeas relief was warranted for legal error under AEDPA only if “there is no possibility fair-
minded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's 
precedents.”183 Subsequent to that reformulation of the § 2254(d)(1) standard, the Court further 
narrowed the availability of review by holding that the “clearly established” federal law relevant 
to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry encompassed only decisions handed down when the state court ruled, 
rather than when that ruling became final.184 Rather than being closely divided, this decision was 
unanimous: The fault rule is uncontroversial across ideological lines in the habeas context, that 
is, just as it is uncontroversial in the constitutional tort and (sometimes) in the evidentiary 
suppression contexts. Accordingly, there is a wide consensus within the Court that habeas relief 
should be available now only where a petitioner can demonstrate “the exceptional 
blameworthiness of the state” 185 —a state of affairs that parallels developments in the 
constitutional tort and the exclusionary rule contexts.  
 
In sum, the present crystallization of the fault rule in postconviction habeas is a function 
of judicial rather than congressional preferences. This fact points toward one further inference 
worth developing here: The fault rule is a function of judicial interests and preferences, including 
a worry about caseload, rather than an expression of legislative will. As early as 1953, Justice 
Jackson worried about the demoralizing effect of a “flood” of habeas cases.186 The worry did not 
abate over time. To the contrary, the volume of habeas petitions increased by more than one third 
between the mid-1970s and the late 1989 Teague rule.187 The same year that Teague was 
decided, Justice Kennedy (albeit writing in dissent) warned that against decisions that would 
                                                            
180 Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–413 (2000).  
181 Id. at 377 (discussing the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) applied in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 
1998) (emphasis added)). 
182 For a detailed account of this process, see Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 536-41. 
183 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (stating further that only “extreme malfunctions in the state 
criminal justice system” warrant relief (citation omitted)). Although Richter was not unanimous, it has been cited 
approvingly in subsequent unanimous opinions. invocations of the Richter standard. See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 
133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013).  
184 Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011). 
185 Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 581. 
186 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (““It must prejudice the occasional 
meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is 
likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”). 
187 BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POST-
CONVICTION LITIGATION 135 (2013) (presenting data on state postconviction filings between 1941 and 2010). 
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“increase prisoner litigation and add to the burden on the federal courts.”188 Further, during the 
1980s both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell frequently spoke out about the costs of 
habeas in terms of delay, especially in the capital penalty context. 189  Simultaneously, 
administration officials such as the Attorney General decried “the flood of habeas corpus 
petitions engulfing our federal courts.”190 The story recounted here—in which a fault rule is 
adopted at the Court’s urging and then gradually rendered more onerous through common-law 
recalibration—is one that is most easily explained, at least in substantial part, by the institutional 
interests of the judiciary. 
 
E. Summary  
 
 This Part has identified a fault rule that plays a gatekeeping function across a 
transubstantive space of individualized constitutional remedies. In seeking damages for a 
constitutional torts, the suppression of unconstitutionally secured evidence, or relief from an 
unconstitutionally imposed criminal conviction, an individual claimant must often demonstrate 
not just that the Constitution was violated, but that the violation was an especially clear and 
especially unambiguous one. Fault of this kind requires a showing that a respondent official did 
not violate a constitutional law, but that he or she blew past a foundational rule that he or she 
should have well known. Absent such fault, the individual petitioning for relief from a discrete 
official act infringing on constitutional rights is typically not only denied a remedy, but even a 
plenary day in court. The transubstantive and transdoctrinal fault rule identified here, in short, is 
highly effective at rationing out judicial resources, as well as installing a buffer from liability for 
state officials treading close to the law’s edge. 
 
 In recounting the history and development of this fault rule, I have further stressed two 
points. First, I have intimated a point to be developed in full in Part II: that the rule is a judicial 
creation, and not an emanation of congressional will. The Court has used doctrine to “to 
communicate … policy preferences” to lower courts, not to enforce congressional preferences.191 
This observation provides a point of departure for Part II’s analysis of the etiology of the fault 
rule. Second, I have also pointing in passing to evidence suggesting that the institutional 
concerns of the federal judiciary in part motivated adoption of this fault rule. Again, amplifying 
                                                            
188 Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Marin Levy has demonstrated that the 
Court has maintained an inconsistent view toward floodgates arguments in the habeas context, sometimes accepting 
them and sometimes repudiating them as inconsistent with the statutory text. Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of 
Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1043-49 (2013). Levy’s focus, however, on the kind of arguments the Court 
deploys, and not the effects of doctrine on caseload volumes. My aim is to explain the evolving contours of doctrine, 
and for that purposes rhetoric is not necessarily probative.  
189 Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus 
Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 723-25 (2002) 
190 Ira P. Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 111 
F.R.D. 265, 266-67 (1987) (footnote omitted). Rhetorical invocation of a “flood” of habeas petitions dates at least 
lack to Professor Bator’s landmark article. Bator, supra note 162, at 506.  
191 Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 
536–37 (2011). For other accounts of doctrine as an instrument for transmitting policy preferences across a 
geographically diffused judiciary, see Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in 
a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
101, 103 (2000); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a 
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994).  
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and exploring the implicit political economy at work here is a thread of argument to be taken up 
in Part II.  
 
II. The Causal Link Between Remedial Rationing and Judicial Independence  
 
 This Part advances the causal claim that fault, as a regulative principle for rationing 
scarce judicial resources, finds at least some causal foundation in the institutional independence 
of the federal judiciary above and beyond the ideological and policy-focused concerns that 
immediately spring to mind. I develop four lines of argument for thinking that judicial 
independence—understood as the federal judiciary’s autonomy, rather than as a characteristic of 
any individual judge—has played a role in catalyzing the fault-based rationing of constitutional 
remedies. First, building on the evidence presented in Part I, I repudiate arguments for attributing 
fault’s contours to the Court, rather than to Congress or the strategic behavior of litigants. 
Second, I suggest reasons for concluding that the doctrinal developments described in Part I were 
not motivated wholly by ideological change on the Court. These two lines of arguments clear 
space for alternative explanations focused on institutional interests. Thus, the third argument I 
develop is a historical account of those institutional interests that adds context and affirmative 
circumstantial evidence for attributing the fault rule to judicial independence. Finally, I present a 
powerful piece of circumstantial evidence: The fault rule does not encompass all forms of 
constitutional remediation, and its scope is well explained by institutional, not ideological, 
interests.  
 
A. Fault as a Judicial or a Congressional Rule  
 
 The first piece of evidence linking the gatekeeping fault rule for individual constitutional 
remedies to the institutional interests of the federal judiciary is to be found in the origin of that 
rule: As Part I suggested, it is impossible to attribute the fault rule’s emergence to legislative 
initiative. To the contrary, it has emerged from judicial sources through common-law 
adjudication, albeit with occasional support from the legislative branch of the federal 
government. Moreover, I shall argue here, this fault rule cannot be ascribed merely to the 
different incentives and resources of litigants, which is a staple in scholarly explanations of 
litigation outcomes.  
 
1. Fault as a Legislative Imposition?  
 
One implication result of the analysis offered in Part I is that Congress, notwithstanding 
its formally plenary control of federal courts jurisdiction,192 plays little direct role in crafting 
constitutional remedies.193 That analysis shows that at least in the individual remedies domain, 
Congress’s influence is notable mainly by its absence. This is true in regard to both the creation 
and the evisceration of remedies. To be sure, Congress was responsible for enacting both a civil 
damages remedy against state for constitutional violations in 1871 and a postconviction habeas 
                                                            
192 U.S. CONST, Art. III, cl.1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in 
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). Bert I. Huang, Lightened 
Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2011) (finding that “when flooded by the [administrative] agency cases, 
… circuit courts began to reverse district court rulings less often--in the civil cases”). 
193 This is not to say that legislators do not play an indirect role. Docket pressures in statutory cases for example 
influence not only adjudicative procedures, but also substantive outcomes. 
 30 
writ in 1867.194 But both remedies lay dormant for three-quarters of a century before being 
revived by the Court. And, as Part I demonstrated at length, the subsequent contraction of habeas 
review, the exclusionary rule, and constitutional tort actions has also largely been the work of the 
courts rather than Congress.195 This is most obviously so with qualified immunity, a doctrine 
unembarrassed by any purchase in the statutory text, has been openly motivated by the Court’s 
own “considerations of public policy” since the 1970s.196 That doctrine, as James Pfander has 
noted, “represent[s] a remarkable exercise of judicial creativity,” not an exemplar of legislative 
control.197 
This is not to say that Congress plays no role at all. In some respects, Congress has 
seconded the Court’s campaign to constrain individual constitutional remedies. But its main 
interventions, AEPDA and the Prison Litigation Reform Act198 were enacted in 1996—many 
years after the main elements of the fault-based regime described in Part I.199 As Part I.D. 
explored at length, AEDPA’s role in catalyzing the fault rule in habeas is overstated: That rule, 
now embodied in § 2254(d)(1) was anticipated by Justice Thomas four years before AEDPA was 
enacted, and the effective force of § 2254(d)(1) gatekeeping system has fluctuated over time as 
the Court has taken an increasingly miniatory view of the postconviction writ over time. To 
understand AEDPA’s installation of fault in § 2254(d)(1) as a de facto delegation to the Court, 
which would then independently calibrate that rule is, moreover, consistent with the statute’s 
legislative history, which is ambiguous, conflicted, and far less amenable to unilaterally statist 
readings than the Court has sometimes suggested.200 
 
But in other respects, Congress has either been rebuffed or taken a more lenient view of 
constitutional plaintiffs than the Court. On the one hand, on some occasions, Congress 
intervenes, seemingly to promote a trend a majority of the Court has already endorsed, and its 
intrusion is deemed by the Justices to be an insult to judicial suzerainty over constitutional 
interpretation. Justices, not legislators, therefore have the last word for all practical purposes over 
the remedial dispensation. In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona,201 for example, Congress directed 
that a statement made by a defendant in custody “shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given.”202 In Dickerson v. United States, however, the Court notoriously held that 
Congress could not supersede Miranda because the latter had announced a “constitutional 
                                                            
194 See supra Part I.A. 
195 Id.  
196 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 90 to 115. 
197 James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1387, 1389 (2010). 
198 Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.A. tits. 11, 18, 28, and 42). 
199 This is not to say that these measures did not supplement meaningfully previous judicial efforts at rationing. The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, for example, was “highly successful in reducing litigation, triggering a forty-three 
percent decline over five years.” Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1694 (2003). 
200 Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 445 (2007) (“Given 
what we know about AEDPA's legislative history, there is little support for the argument that courts should interpret 
AEDPA's ambiguities with any particular purposes in mind.”). 
201 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
202 18 U.S.C. § 3501. 
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rule,”203 a ruling that rested upon “a strong statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation” rather than a shared hermeneutic responsibility.204  
 
On yet other occasions, Congress has been more solicitous of plaintiffs seeking 
constitutional remedies than the Court. For example, rather than narrowing Bivens, Congress has 
taken care to preserve that remedy when regulating government liability in tort via the Westfall 
Act.205 The Westfall Act virtually immunizes federal government officials from state common 
law tort liability, substituting the government as a defendant upon the issuance of a certification 
by the Attorney General. Congress, however, expressly declared the exclusivity rule inapplicable 
to suits brought against government officials “for a violation of the Constitution of the United 
States,”206 a category that most obviously reaches Bivens actions. In short, even in limiting 
governmental liability, Congress was careful to preserve individual officer suits created by the 
Court. This is in striking contrast to the Court’s approach, which has been largely hostile to 
Bivens actions.207 
 
A possible rejoinder to this line of argument might start from the observation that the 
doctrinal changes canvassed in Part I are a function not of judicial preferences, but instead 
should be attributed to Congress because any discretionary policy-making by the Court operates 
in the shadow of legislative correction.208 On this view, it is impossible in the absence of a 
constitutional ruling to attribute doctrinal change to judicial preferences because given the 
omnipresent possibility of legislative correction. I am not persuaded, however, that it is 
infeasible to make inferences about judicial preferences. The concern about judicial decisions 
merely anticipate Congress’s preferences is deeply flawed both as a theoretical and an empirical 
matter.  
As a theoretical matter, it fails to account for the nature of legislation produced by a 
bicameralism legislative system attended by a presidential veto. A now canonical body of work 
in political science demonstrates that in any political system with “many veto players separated 
by large ideological distance … legislation can only be incremental.”209 Moreover, as the 
complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specification rise, legislators will tend 
more and more to delegate decisions rather than resolving hard questions themselves.210 As a 
result, “[t]he constitutional process for enacting legislation, which requires all legislative 
proposals to pass through two chambers of Congress and be presented to the President (or, in the 
                                                            
203 530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000). 
204 Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 62 (2000). 
205 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 
102 Stat. 4563. 
206 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). 
207 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 44, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a good deal more circumspect” 
in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts). 
208 I have not been able to locate any published work taking this position, but the argument has been pressed upon 
me in correspondence and conversations with much eloquence and force by Mike Seidman. Notwithstanding our 
disagreement on this (and many other points), I am very grateful to him for discussions on this point.  
209 George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis, 93 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591, 605 (1999). Tsebelis is describing parliamentary systems, but the point applies here.  
210 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST APPROACH TO POLICY-
MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999). 
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event of a presidential veto, to survive supermajority votes in the House and Senate), provides 
considerable protection for federal jurisdiction.”211 
As an empirically matter, the argument from legislative dominance grossly overstates the 
efficacy of congressional control. As Tara Grove has documented, “from the late nineteenth 
century to the present day demonstrates that the lawmaking procedures of Article I have 
repeatedly safeguarded the federal judiciary.”212 Widening the lens, empirical work by William 
Eskridge and others shows the probability of congressional override to be diminishing over time, 
with successful legislation characterized by bipartisan efforts at updating regulatory policy, 
rather than controversial and divisive “corrections” of Supreme Court errors.213 There is little 
cause for a Court with its own policy preferences over a controversial domain such as 
constitutional remedies, that is, to beat to windward under the influence of anticipated legislative 
intervention.  
2. Fault as an Outcome of Litigant Incentives?  
 
If legislative incentives do not predict or explain the use of fault to ration constitutional 
remedies, is there some other factor exogenous to the federal courts that might do explanatory 
work? More than forty years ago, Marc Galanter pointed out that “[r]epeat play” litigants, who 
are able to identify relatively technical issues upon which liability turns, will, all else being 
equal, prevail more frequently than one-shot claimants.214 Consistent with this insight, the 
Solicitor General acting on behalf of the United States enjoys an unusual success rates in the 
Court,215 and is perhaps uniquely situated to stymie effective channels of constitutional redress. 
Can then the fault rule be attributed to the ability of government litigants to coordinate with low 
transaction costs, to select favorable test cases for certiorari review, and to persist where 
individual litigants might sag?  
 
The short answer is no. Litigant resources cannot explain the emergence and migration of 
fault that was described in Part I for a number of reasons. First, it is easy to overstate the 
government’s success rate (especially of late),216 and to forget that there are organized interest 
groups on the other side of many constitutional rights issues, ranging from property rights 
                                                            
211 Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 871 (2011). 
212 Id. at 916. 
213 Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory 
Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014) (finding that after the 1990s, “overrides declined as 
dramatically as they had ascended”). Further, “override statutes frequently supported by bipartisan majorities in 
Congress that have as their stated goal the updating of public law, rather than ‘correction’ of judicial mistakes.” Id. 
at 1320. It is very unlikely that the Justices imposing the fault rule did so because they anticipated a bipartisan 
majority in both Houses that would overrule them otherwise. For an even more pessimistic view of Congress’s 
power to override judicial decisions, see Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the 
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 217 (2013). 
214 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y 
REV. 95, 97 (1974) (drawing the distinction. 
215 For example, approximately 70 percent of the cases recommended for a certiorari grant by the Solicitor General 
are reviewed by the Court. Adam D. Chandler, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous 
Advocate?, 121 YALE L.J. 725, 728 (2011). 
216 See Charles Hurt, The Supreme Court’s Biggest Loser: Barack Obama, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2014, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/1/the-supreme-courts-biggest-loser-barack-obama/ (arguing that 
the Obama administration in 2014 suffered an unusual string of high-profile losses).  
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advocates to organizations promoting the interests of distinct racial and ethnic groups. To say 
that government always wins because it is a repeat player, that is, is to ignore the countervailing 
pressures, not to mention the plain fact that the government does not uniformly win across the 
substantive and remedial board. Second, many of the pivotal changes to the doctrine have been 
effected sua sponte by the federal courts, rather than flowing from prolonged litigation 
campaigns by organized government interests. Recall for example that the catalyst for the first 
iteration of a good faith rule in the exclusionary rule contest was the Court’s decision to add a 
question to a certiorari petition presenting a Fourth Amendment issue.217 In the habeas context, 
the Court initially rejected the narrowest reading of § 2254(d)(1), and then of its own initiative 
tightened up that standard in a series of cases in which no party demanded such increased 
scrutiny.218  
 
In short, reliance on congressional preferences or litigant asymmetries is persuasive in 
neither as a theoretical matter or as a matter of fit with the observed processes of doctrinal 
change. The gatekeeping rule for constitutional remedies is better understood as a function of 
judicial preferences.  
 
B. Judicial Ideology as a Cause of Remedial Rationing 
 
A considerable body of scholarship identifies the ideological roots of changes to 
constitutional doctrine in the late 1970s and 1980s as the Warren Court gave way to the Burger 
and the Rehnquist Courts.219 In the light of that scholarship, the development of fault might be 
explained in simple ideological terms: The Court became more conservative as President Nixon 
and other Republicans made more appointments.220 It was also aware of, and sensitive to, 
changes in the crime rate in that period—changes that confirmed the worries of new conservative 
appointees.221 And perhaps—most cynically and crassly—one might suppose that some of the 
new Justices were less than sympathetic to certain populations’ constitutional claims.222 Given 
the overlapping influences of ideology, concerns about crime control, and racialized politics, it 
might be though that there is no room for an account focused on the institutional interests of the 
Supreme Court. Making a place for institutional interests, therefore, requires some response to 
reductive accounts of doctrinal change.  
                                                            
217 See supra text accompanying note 130. 
218 Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 540 (explaining that recent changes to the interpretation of §2254(d)(1) were not 
made at the behest of the parties). 
219 See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 17. 
220 JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED 
THE SUPREME COURT 16 (2001) (recounting then-presidential advisor William Rehnquist’s advice to President 
Reagan to appoint “strict constructionists” to the federal courts, who “will generally not be favorably inclined 
toward claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights plaintiffs”). 
221 See Arenella, supra note 17, at 187. But see Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-
Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?) and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE 
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62, 62-63, 90-91 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (suggesting 
that the distinctions between the Warren and Burger Courts were based more on fear of what might happen than on 
the more moderate changes the Burger Court actually made). 
222 See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March and the Speech: History, 
Memory, Values, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 17, 56 (2015) (“The [Reagan-era] concern with ‘criminal defendants’ 
reflected the new rhetoric of non-racial categories that nonetheless carried racial significance for many 
Americans.”). 
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My aim in this section is to demonstrate that whatever role ideology—whether subtly or 
crassly defined—played, it cannot explain wholesale the development of the fault rule. That is, I 
do not doubt that the changing composition of the Court over the 1970s and 1980s influenced the 
development of the case-law. I do doubt that ideology, or the politics of crime and race, is the 
whole story.223 The primary evidence for my claim to this effect is simple: Key precedent in all 
three lines of cases is not characterized by sharp ideological division. Instead, in the qualified 
immunity and habeas precedent in particular, there is a surprising frequency of supermajoritarian 
and even unanimous opinions. Further, the rate of dissent seems to diminish rapidly over time 
with an alacrity that is not well explained by appointment-driven change. Hence, the distribution 
of votes on the Court is hard to square with purely ideological accounts. I first work through this 
evidence, and then adduce a series of supplemental reasons for resisting crassly ideological 
accounts.  
 
Consider first qualified immunity. The fons et origo of much modern qualified immunity 
doctrine is Pierson v. Ray, an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren from which only Justice 
Douglas dissented.224 Butz v. Economou,225 which intimated the functional basis for qualified 
immunity and extended that immunity to federal officials, attracted dissents only from Justices 
who would have applied absolute immunity. The Court’s full-bore adoption of a functionalist 
logic in Harlow v. Fitzgerald similarly attracted only the lone protest of Chief Justice Burger, 
from a statist, pro-defendant perspective.226 The creation of absolute immunity for prosecutors in 
Imbler v. Pachtman, once more, elicited only a concurrence from Justices White, Brennan, and 
Marshall that largely approved of “the judgment of the Court and … much of its reasoning.”227 
Today, the majority of applications of qualified immunity elicit not just a majority, but 
unanimity, from the Court.228 For example, Justice Scalia’s statement in 2011 that qualified 
immunity shelters “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” 
elicited no protests from the liberal wing of the Court, despite its distance from the qualified 
immunity doctrine of even the Burger Court. 229  Simply put, qualified immunity—
notwithstanding its potentially significant normative and distributive effects—is beyond debate 
at least within the precincts of the current Court. 
 
There have been instances, to be sure, in which liberal Justices resisted the increasingly 
calcification of constitutional tort law via qualified immunity, but this resistance was to prove 
short lived. In Anderson v. Creighton, for example, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall 
criticized “the Court’s (literally unwarranted) extension of qualified immunity,” noting that the 
Fourth Amendment’s rule of probable cause already provided officers with ample breathing 
                                                            
223 One problem with these ideological accounts of the Court’s conservative turn is their general failure to recognize 
the historical depth of political polarization over crime, and the complex etiology of harsh penal policy. See 
generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON AND THER GALLOWS (2006).  
224 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
225 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
226 457 U.S. 800, 822 (1982). 
227 424 U.S. 409, 432 (1976). 
228 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (unanimous); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) 
(unanimous). 
229 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malloy v. Riggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1985)). Justice 
Ginsburg, along with Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, concurred only in the judgment, but did not object to this 
formulation of qualified immunity. Id. at 2087. 
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room.230 By 2014, however, Anderson had become sufficiently routinized that liberal Justices not 
only joined opinions that cited its rule, but agreed to per curiam reversals on its basis.231 And 
where the application of the demanding Anderson rule elicits dissents, it is a supermajority of 
Justices that includes both liberals and conservatives to be found insisting on a harsh application 
of that rule.232 In short, there is little reason to gloss the emergence of qualified immunity as a 
doctrinal change associated with the conservative, pro-law-and-order wing of the Court. Rather, 
that doctrine has long had substantial cross-ideological support—support that has only deepened 
over time.  
Qualified immunity doctrine yields one further item of evidence that suggests the role of 
institutional, rather than ideological, concerns in shaping the law. In 2001, the Court held in 
Saucier v. Katz that courts engaged in a qualified immunity analysis had to follow a certain 
sequence of analysis starting with a mandatory “initial inquiry” into whether a constitutional rule 
had been violated before any determination of clearly established law.233 Writing for the Court in 
Saucier, Justice Kennedy explained that this analytic sequence would facilitate “the process for 
the law's elaboration from case to case”234 and hence ensure expeditious development of clearly 
established rules to serve as a predicate for constitutional tort liability. Yet eight years later, the 
Court in Pearson v. Callahan unanimously abandoned the Saucier sequencing rule in favor of a 
rule that allowed lower courts to forego the “initial inquiry” into the law in favor of a ruling on 
whether a “clearly established” rule had been violated.235 Because this reversal has the effect of 
decelerating the rate at which constitutional rules become clearly established, it not only 
increases the chances that a plaintiff subject to Pearson rule will lose but also diminishes the 
chances that many other future plaintiffs will lose for want of a clearly established rule.  
Pearson is telling not merely because it was unanimous, but because it was liberal 
Justices, led by Justice Breyer, who launched the call for Saucier’s reconsideration—and did so 
on the basis of institutional consideration. Hence, Justice Breyer in 2004 criticized Saucier on the 
ground that “when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order of battle’ makes little 
administrative sense.”236 In 2007, he reiterated his concern that the rule was “wasting judicial 
resources.”237 That is, it was a liberal Justice who pressed first and most urgently for the larger 
application of qualified immunity’s fault rule in a way that predictability would conduce to less 
clearly established law and fewer constitutional tort recoveries. And that Justice did so expressly 
out of institutional concerns related to his conception of the federal judiciary’s sound operation. 
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Qualified immunity doctrine, in short, embodies powerful evidence that ideological 
considerations do not exhaust the causal forces motivating the rise and currently hegemonic 
status of fault-based gatekeeping rules.  
A similar tale of ideological convergence can be told in respect to habeas jurisprudence. 
At least in the last decade or so, ideological conflict over habeas—as opposed to over the death 
penalty—a distinct matter often entangled in habeas cases—has almost wholly abated with both 
liberal and conservative Justices to praise and enforce a fault-based regime. It is certainly true 
that early cases installing fault-based gatekeeping rules elicited dissents. For example, the 
Court’s 2000 ruling on the meaning of §2254(d)(1)’s gatekeeping rule was highly fractured.238 
Even then, it is worth emphasizing the supermajority quality of many opinions. The pivotal 
decision of Wainwright v. Sykes,239 which installed one of the first fault-based rules for habeas, 
was hence seven-two, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting.240 
Yet ideological division has proved remarkably evanescent. Even as the Court has 
ratcheted up the intensity of the fault threshold for habeas, the Court has coalesced into a united 
front in demanding that habeas petitioners satisfy Harrington’s more onerous and demanding 
version of the statutory fault rule241 that was rejected by in 2000 by the Court at a time when it 
had more Republican appointees.242 Nor is Harrington an outlier:243 There is a remarkable series 
of unanimous decisions in which the unanimous Court, often acting per curiam, has reversed 
habeas decisions without briefing or oral argument based on the petitioner’s failure to show 
sufficient fault.244 These cases show that the fault rule is so uncontroversial among all the 
Justices, whether liberal or conservative, that they are willing to jettison their ordinary rule 
against error correction.245 The trajectory of habeas jurisprudence, in short, speaks to the strength 
of institutional as opposed to ideological motives as a causal force.246  
Finally, consider the exclusionary rule. A fault rule for suppression remedies was 
justified first in judicial economy terms, not in overdeterrence terms. Hence, in a pre-Leon 
concurrence, Justice White argued that a fault-based limitation in suppression remedies would 
yield a “reduction in the number of cases which will require elongated considerations of the 
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probable cause question.”247 Nevertheless, the evidence of ideological polarization over the 
exclusion clause is weaker than in qualified immunity and habeas contexts. But it is not absent. 
Whereas early cases such as Leon attracted multiple dissents,248 more recent opinions, such as 
Arizona v. Evans, have attracted smaller dissents.249 And the Court’s most recent extension of 
Leon in Heien v. North Carolina has accrued only a single dissent.250  
In short, a careful examination of the caseload does not support the conclusion that fault-
based remedial rationing is a consequence of ideological change alone. Although ideology and 
concern about crime have certainly been salient, they do not capture the whole story: Justices 
repeatedly emphasize caseload and judicial economy concerns in regard to habeas, suppression 
remedies, and constitutional tort. And the coalitions observed in the jurisprudence belie any 
simple ideological account. Consistent with this ideological variation, not all of the doctrines 
canvassed above concern constitutional challenges typically favored by liberal Justices and 
disfavored by conservative Justices. Challenges to state taxes, for example, lack any obvious 
ideological valence and yet are hedged by a species of the fault rule.251 A Bivens claim subject to 
qualified immunity is available just as much to a rancher infuriated by meddling federal land 
officials as a racial minority subject to harassing and intrusive federal policing.252 To boil the 
case-law to ideology, in short, is to fail to take seriously the Court qua court, to ignore the 
statements of the Justices, and to blink to observed patterns of judicial coalition-formation. It is 
to impose a crude functionalism on a Court that, in practice, is much more supple. 
 
C. Circumstantial Evidence of the Institutional Roots of the Fault Rule  
 
To claim that courts—rather than legislators or litigants have been responsible for the 
ascendency of fault is to assert that federal judges have had both institutional means and 
sufficient motives to install the regime described in Part I. There is, however, considerable 
historical and contemporaneous empirical evidence of both means and motive. Marshaling that 
evidence, I advance two points here to support the causal link between judicial independence and 
fault-based rationing of constitutional remedies. First, notwithstanding the clichéd image of a 
federal judiciary as weak and dependent upon the political branches, 253  historians have 
developed an account of the federal judiciary as an institution that as a branch has accreted 
gradually a great deal of autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests.254 Second, 
empirical work identifies caseload management as a core institutional interest of the federal 
judiciary. Vindicating institutional autonomy in the federal judicial context, therefore, translates 
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as managing the flow of cases. Focusing on the period of time in which the fault rule 
developed—the late 1970s and early 1980s—in particular reveals considerable circumstantial 
evidence that the Justices viewed constitutional remediation as problematic in caseload terms. 
Both the judiciary’s means and its motives for fault-based remedial rationing, in short, are amply 
supported by available evidence.  
 
1. The Judiciary’s Institutional Interest in Caseload Management  
 
Consider first the historical trajectory of branch-level independence. At the time of the 
Founding, the constitutional text vested Congress with broad formal authority over the 
jurisdictional structure and funding of the federal courts. 255  Nevertheless, post-Founding 
developments rendered that such authority increasingly formal rather than real. Rather than a 
function of constitutional text, therefore, judicial independence at a branch level has emerged as 
a result of institutional developments over the long run of American history.256 There was 
nothing inevitable or necessary, moreover, about this development. Rather, institutional 
pathways in historical time are contingent matters, vulnerable to the accidents of personality and 
exogenous shocks. Regardless of the particular pathway taken, however, it is inevitable that an 
institution crafted in a handful of words in 1789 would evolve, mutate, and even metastasize in 
unexpected ways over two hundred years of historical time.257  
 
Recent historical work zeroes in upon the first part of the twentieth century as a turning 
point. During this period, the federal judiciary successfully lobbied Congress to delegate 
important authority over key jurisdictional and administrative powers to the bench. In 1922, for 
example, Congress created the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,258 a modest entity later to 
develop into the Judicial Conference of the United States, a full-scale bureaucracy with statutory 
authority to lobby by “submit[ting] to Congress . . . its recommendations for legislation.”259 In 
1925, Chief Justice William Howard Taft engaged in “unprecedented efforts” to lobby Congress 
into granting the Supreme Court almost unfettered discretion over its caseload, near plenary 
authority to set its own agenda, and freedom to determine how and why it would intervene on 
matters of national salience.260 In 1934, Congress “was compelled to delegate power to the 
Court” to set rules for the judiciary in the Rules Enabling Act, signaling that “the federal 
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judiciary had arrived as a power player in the national political scene.”261 The subsequent 
creation of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts further weakened executive branch 
influence on the judiciary.262 Over this period, the executive branch also extended support to the 
judiciary, which it viewed as a vehicle for pursuing its own political agenda, in effect checking 
congressional leverage of jurisdictional controls.263 The net result of these accumulated reforms 
was to empower the judiciary with the institutional instruments and procedural avenues to pursue 
its (self-defined interests).  
 
Capturing this rise in branch-level judicial independence, the political scientist Kevin 
McGuire has assembled a longitudinal index of the federal judiciary’s institutionalization.264 This 
index bundles measures of the Supreme Court’s institutional differentiation from other federal 
entities, the durability of its interests, and its autonomy from other political forces.265 Measured 
over the twentieth century, McGuire’s index evinces a steady upward trend line such that by the 
1960s, the Court had become a “distinctive and independent force within the federal 
government.”266 McGuire’s conclusion is supported by a second set of studies examining how 
the Court exercises judicial review. These studies of time trends in judicial exercise of the power 
to invalidate state and federal statutes identifies a peak in the early twentieth century and another 
peak from the 1960s through the 1980s.267 To the extent that judicial willingness to invalidate 
duly enacted laws is a metric of judicial independence, the late twentieth century marks one of its 
high water marks.268  
 
This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of evidence that judges act 
upon the basis of institutional interests determined by their position within Article III. Of course, 
it is well known that the policy preferences of appointing presidents powerfully shape the 
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distribution of federal judicial candidates presented to and confirmed by the Senate.269 A recent 
empirical study by Thomas Keck thus concludes that judicial motivations “are shaped in part by 
a sense of institutional duty.”270 Keck examined three possible explanations for the Supreme 
Court’s decision to invalidate federal statutes—partisan differences, policy disagreements, and 
institutional disagreements. Contra accounts that focus on the partisan drivers of judicial review, 
Keck concluded that “more than sixty percent” of federal laws struck down between 1981 and 
2005” are “consistent with” an institutional account of judicial review in which the Justices are 
“motivated by the desire to defend judicial authority against incursions from the other 
branches.”271 In contrast, “[m]ost” of instances of judicial review in that time period “fit 
uneasily” with a policy or partisan differences account.272  Keck’s study concerns federal 
statutory invalidations, not the regulation of state criminal justice systems. But it would be 
extraordinary if the Justices’ preferences varied not just in quality but also in kind between 
different domains. There is therefore no reason to think that his inferences do not extend to the 
doctrinal areas discussed here.  
 
If the judiciary possesses both a degree of autonomy from other branches and also a 
distinct understanding of its institutional interests, it becomes necessary to identify those 
interests. Theoretical, empirical, and self-reported data from the federal bench demonstrates that 
moderating the flow of cases, and in particular requests for constitutional remedies, comprises a 
central element of the Article III judiciary’s institutional interests.  
 
At a theoretical level, Judge Richard Posner has posited “leisure” as a central element in 
the judicial utility function.273 Empirical studies confirm Posner’s intuition. These show that 
federal judges, like any other supplier of labor, are averse to excessive demands on their time.274 
Because these demands are determined on an institution-wide basis, it follows that federal judges 
must attend to their individual interest in minimizing unwanted effort through doctrinal tools that 
are systemic in character. Consistent with both the narrow and the broad interpretation of 
institutional interests, both liberal and conservative Justices alike express concern about the 
ability of the federal courts to fulfill their adjudicative role given rising caseloads.275 This ability 
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is threatened by rising caseloads, which have already overwhelmed courts’ ability to give 
individualized consideration to every discrete matter, and led to the substitution of law clerk and 
staff attorney consideration in lieu of Article III eyes.276  
 
The theoretical and empirical evidence aligns with the historical record and self-reports 
from the Justices. By the 1980s, judges and scholars uniformly defined the problem of “judicial 
reform” as primarily a “problem … of workload”277 This results in a series of commissions, 
starting with the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court created by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger in 1971, to analyze backlogs in judicial business” and “inadequacies in judicial 
organization.”278 The Study Group and its successors the Commission on Revision of the 
Appellate System and the Hruska Commission, failed to catalyze legislative action, but 
nonetheless “raised awareness” of the caseload concern.279 Of course, this was the first time that 
federal judges had complained of capacity constraints.280 But it seems clear that the late 1970s 
and 1980s were a time at which the pressures of adjudication were felt to be especially acute, and 
thus a warrant for both study and institutional change.  
 
2. Caseload Management in the Era of Fault 
 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were distinct in another way: They were the beginning of 
a four-fold increase in the rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons.281 At the time, crime 
appeared a major, and increasingly serious, national problem. Crime rates had been rising since 
the 1960s, with no prospect of a plateau in sight. The national homicide rate, for example, had 
doubled in the decade after 1964, and was continuing to rise in 1980.282 Street-level crime was 
also perceived as a national problem, warranting responses from national institutions. In 1981, 
for example, the new Attorney General William French Smith, convened a task force to 
determine how federal resources could be switched from white-collar to street-crime.283 Further, 
“[i]n the 1980s and 1990s, criminal justice policy and practice was influenced by the notion that 
the country was facing an epidemic of ‘juvenile superpredators.’”284 In short, policy-makers had 
cause to believe that crime control would remain a priority for the foreseeable future. 
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Federal criminal adjudicative policy shifted accordingly. The absolute volume of federal 
criminal defendants had fluctuated substantially since World War II, dropped in the late 1940s 
and 1950s due to declining immigration enforcement. But it began “surg[ing] between 1970 and 
1977 and then [falling] back temporarily from 1977 to 1980,” before growing “in almost every 
year from 1980.”285 Indeed, the “number of federal criminal prosecutions has grown steadily, 
with little fluctuation, since 1980, at a rate of about 1,500 additional cases per year” with “a 
significant part” of that growth due to “the growing number of controlled substance prosecutions 
and stepped-up enforcement against immigration law violators.”286 As a result, the number of 
federal offenders imprisoned for drug offenses ballooned from 4900 in 1980 to 98,675 in 2007.287 
From the perspective of the Supreme Court in the early 1980s, the then-incipient growth of 
federal criminal caseloads might have seemed to portend serious future pressures on federal 
dockets. 
 
Given this constellation of factors—most of which would have been readily apparent to 
the Justices—it is possible to hypothesize that the incipient pressures of mass incarceration on 
the federal courts in the form of greatly increased volumes of suppression motions and habeas 
petitions—and not merely the direct effects of crime—were not lost on the Court even at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Hence, during the period at which the fault rule was developed, the 
Court was at the acme of its institutional autonomy, and also inclined by habit and instruction to 
view the volume of litigation as not just a problem, but the defining problem for the federal 
courts. That problem, finally, likely seemed most pressing in the criminal law domain, where 
increasing reliance on the carceral state to solve social problems produced larger and larger 
caseload pressures on the federal judiciary.288 
 
Can the rise of fault be explained as a response to rising crime rates without regard to the 
freestanding institutional concerns of the judiciary? There are a number of reasons for resisting 
this reductive conclusion. First, as already recounted,289 the gatekeeping fault rule did not emerge 
solely at the behest of Justices appointed by presidents centrally concerned with crime control. 
Rather, it has been a bipartisan project.  
 
Second, while Justices have expressed concern with crime control, they have since the 
1950s repeatedly articulated their resistance to constitutional remediation in terms of the 
judiciary’s institutional interest in caseload management. Part II.B contains many of these 
statements, ranging from Justice White’s early concerns about the Fourth Amendment 
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suppression remedy290 to Justice Breyer’s concern about the burden of constitutional tort 
litigation in the lower courts.291 There is no reason to view these statements as disingenuous or 
simply false. Nor are such judicial expressions of concern over the institutional effects of 
constitutional remedies isolated. In respect to each line of ex post remedies doctrine examined 
above, Justices have expressed concern about the manageability of litigation flows absent 
something like a fault rule. In the constitutional tort context, for example, Justice Black 
articulated a concern with “frivolous” suits in his Bivens dissent.292 In the habeas context, 
concerns about the “disproportionate amount of [judicial] time and energy” required for 
postconviction review have long been stock complaints.293 And recently installed limits to the 
exclusionary rule have been underwritten by worries about the “constant flood of alleged 
failures” to conform to the apparently rococo details of the Fourth Amendment.294 Remedial 
reform is thus perceived by the Justices themselves as a function of the rising demand for 
adjudication, a demand that is most plausibly linked to the recent growth and expected continued 
growth of the punitive, policing, and incarcerating state.  
 
Evidence from the Justices’ own lips, moreover, undermines another potential counter-
argument to effect that a fault rule cannot be explained by caseload concerns because such a rule 
would not influence the behavior of habeas petitioners, the public defenders who represent most 
criminal defendants, or those aggrieved by perceived governmental abuse. The Leon Court, for 
example, worried that the availability of suppression would diminish the rate of plea-
bargaining.295 Empirical evidence that this is not so has done nothing to dent the force of the 
fault rule in the Fourth Amendment context.296 Setting the effect of suppression on plea 
bargaining to one side, though, it is hard to believe that the fault rule has not altered the 
incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys dependent on contingency fee payoffs, public defenders 
determining how to ration scarce time and resources,297 or prisoners who may face real trade offs 
in respect to how to allocate time and effort within prison.298 And even if the magnitude of these 
effects is in question, a fault rule might have distinctive appeal to the Justices because it a legal 
intervention that has a clear judicial pedigree and feel, unlike (say) changes to substantive 
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criminal law or the funding of either prosecutors’ or criminal defenders’ offices. It is not 
implausible, that is, to think of fault as an obvious first resort for a judge steeped in common law 
ideas seeking to manage docket pressures.299 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that concerns about 
crime and judicial capacity not only can be complementary but can also interact: If institutional 
concerns were all that mattered, for example, it might simply have altered substantive law to be 
more favorable to plaintiffs, thereby encouraging higher settlement rates, or imposed 
constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law. Concern with crime removes these 
possibilities from the judicial agenda, and pushes the Court to deploy statist instruments to 
manage its dockets.  
 
In tracing a causal chain from the political and social facts of mass incarceration to 
judicial doctrine, my argument here contrasts, and conflicts with William Stuntz’s revered 
criticism of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases. Stuntz argued that the judicial 
regulation of criminal procedure had a perverse effect because “the very existence of defendant-
protective procedural doctrine tends to push toward lower funding and broader substantive 
criminal law.”300 In this fashion, Stuntz suggested that doctrinal change conduced to larger 
institutional change. Stuntz’s story, however, is hard to square with the chronological evidence. 
As Stephen Schulhofer has explained, key changes to criminal sentencing are removed by 
decades from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions.301 Further, other Western natures 
that experienced the same punitive turn did so without any criminal procedure revolution against 
which to react, suggesting that “[p]rofound structural changes in Western industrial society lay at 
the heart of these developments, not judicial doctrine.”302 But Schulhofer does not ask the logical 
next question: Did those “profound structural changes” influence doctrine in ways that alter the 
distribution, and at times the existence, of constitutional remediation? And if so, what mediated 
those effects? The argument developed here suggests that it did via the judiciary’s institutional 
concerns. For there is good reason to think that even if the Court has not shaped the development 
of criminal justice institutions, the latter have directly impinged upon its ability to respond to 
constitutional wrongs.  
 
The Court, in short, had both the means and the motivation to translate its institutional 
autonomy into a fault-based regime of remedial rationing. Both historical and contemporaneous 
evidence suggest that judges define their interests in institutional terms, and that managing the 
federal courts’ caseload is central to their conception of this institutional interest. Against this 
backdrop, the innovations charted in Part I may have seemed logical ways of vindicating the 
institutional independence of the federal judiciary. This diagnosis further suggests that the 
installation of the fault rule will prove relatively durable regardless of the ideological preferences 
of the next president to engage in significant appointments to the Court. Liberal or conservative, 
new Justices are likely to experience and endorse institutional perspectives on docket and case-
load management just as their ideological confreres have. To look to changing patterns of 
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judicial appointment as a solvent of remedial rationing in the constitutional context, therefore, 
may be whistling in the wind.  
 
D.  Institutional Interests and the Boundaries of the Fault Rule 
 
 There is one final argument for glossing the fault rule as a function of institutional 
preferences, and not just as a grossly ideological effect. Under current doctrine, fault plays a 
regulative role with respect to some—but not all—channels of judicial review. Where it applies, 
fault operates as a tax on constitutional claim-making. It thereby disincentivizes claims. Where it 
does not apply, the absence of a fault rule is in effect a subsidy, making such challenges more 
attractive. By shifting the boundaries of fault, the Court elicits and also tamp down on different 
forms of claim-making. An examination of the contours of the Court’s fault-based regime 
suggests that the current dispensation is well designed to maximize the federal bench’s prestige 
while minimizing its labor costs. That is, the contours of the fault rule correspond to, and thereby 
promote, the institutional interests of the judiciary.303 
 
Because this argument turns on some careful parsing of doctrine, I develop it in two 
parts: First, I set identify contexts in which the Court has declined to install a fault rule. Second, I 
explain how the resulting doctrinal contours can be explained in terms the judiciary’s 
institutional interests. This account, while again circumstantial, provides one more item of 
circumstantial evidence for attributing fault-based rationing to the exercise of judicial 
independence.  
 
1. Exceptions to the Fault Rule  
 
Recall first that constitutional torts, suppression motions, and habeas petitions do not 
exhaust the universe of procedural mechanisms for constitutional claim-making. Courts also 
entertain asks for injunctive relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young304 and actions for declaratory 
relief.305 Whereas rights claimants seeking relief using the former mechanism must demonstrate 
fault,306 litigants seeking the latter forms of relief need not show anything more than the bare fact 
of constitutional violation. In a Young action, a defendant might invoke traditional equitable 
doctrines of unclean hands307 and undue hardship,308 which both focus on a kind of fault. But 
few, if any, reported cases turn on these rules, suggesting that they do not play a large role in 
constitutional litigation.309 At least as a general matter, therefore, the availability of equitable 
relief in constitutional cases does not turn on fault.  
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There is, in short, a difference in the cost of asserting a constitutional right that depends 
on which procedural mechanism is employed. The ensuing differential in expected remedial 
value is amplified by the simple fact that injunctive and declarative forms of relief—unlike 
damages, suppression, or vacatur of a conviction—are typically available prophylactically before 
a violation has occurred. 310 Prevention is generally more valuable than post hoc measures that 
rarely make plaintiffs entirely whole. As a result, “federal courts frequently entertain actions for 
injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably 
likely or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”311  
 
The 2013-14 Supreme Court Term provides illustrations. Susan B. Anthony List v. 
Driehaus involved a facial First Amendment challenge to an Ohio statute criminalizing false 
statements about candidates during political campaigns.312 Even though the only complaint 
against the plaintiffs at bar had been dismissed, the unanimous Court discerned a “substantial” 
enough “threat of future enforcement” to establish standing.313 The same term, in McCullen v. 
Coakley, the Court adjudicated another First Amendment challenges to a Massachusetts law 
establishing buffer zones around abortion clinics based on the plaintiffs’ expressed desire to 
enter those zones in the future, rather than any past violation of the law.314 Anticipatory 
challenges of this ilk, of course, are not limited to the First Amendment context.315  
 
The doctrine, however, contains another important wrinkle. Not all anticipatory suits are 
created equal. There is an important difference between “facial” challenges316 to the verbal 
content of laws, such as Susan B. Anthony List and McCullen, and challenges to ongoing 
institutional practices. Whereas facial challenges to laws face low hurdles, in City of Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, the Court imposed a high, often insurmountable, barrier to challenges to official 
practices by dint of a specific element of Article III standing rules.317  
 
To see how, consider the Court’s divergent formulations of plaintiffs’ threshold burdens 
in two cases. In Susan B. Anthony List, the plaintiffs satisfied Article III by showing that their 
conduct was “‘arguably ... proscribed by [the] statute’ they wish to challenge.”318 Simply based 
on the verbal content of the challenged Ohio statute, the unanimous Court had “no difficulty” 
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concluding this threshold had been surmounted. 319 In Lyons, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief 
against a police chokehold practice was asked to make “the incredible assertion either, (1) that 
all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an 
encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning or, (2) that the 
City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.”320 Lyons in effect required a 
plaintiff challenging a practice to collate a large body of evidence, not just about what the law is, 
but about empirical regularities in the world. This is costly, sometimes prohibitively so. Perhaps 
unsurprising, a 2000 analysis found that across 1,200 reported decisions applying Lyons, 1152 
ended in dismissal on standing grounds.321  
 
To summarize, the Court applies a fault rule to individualized tort actions, suppression 
motions, and habeas petitions—all of which challenge granular, singular official acts. No fault 
rule, however, applies to requests for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against 
unconstitutional laws. Ex ante challenges to institutional practices, by contrast, while facing no 
fault rule, are impeded by Lyons rule. The net result is in some tension with the notional stated 
Supreme Court disfavor of hypothetical322 and facial323: requests for constitutional review: a 
relative subsidy for prophylactic facial challenges to laws, a relative tax on individualized claims 
and ex ante challenges to institutional practices.  
 
2. Judicial Interests as a Determinant of the Contours of Fault  
 
This doctrinal arrangement can be nicely explained by an account cognizant of the 
institutional interests of the judiciary. If we assume that judges’ interests are refracted through an 
institutional lens, and thereby focused on managing the federal bench’s workload, that is, current 
doctrinal arrangements follow surprisingly closely from this assumption. To begin with, notice 
that caseload pressure can be more effectively relieved by regulating the broad river of ex post 
remedial demands rather than by staunching the comparatively small number of anticipatory 
requests for relief. Ex post remedies tends to be discrete rather than aggregate in nature, and 
hence more numerous. Different acts of police misconduct, different trial errors by prosecutors, 
and different judicial errors each require distinct suppression hearings, habeas petitions, and 
damages awards to determine facts and allocate relief. These accumulate, imposing a rising toll 
on judicial economy ambitions. A fault rule that plays a gatekeeping rule (such as qualified 
immunity or § 2254(d)(1)) substitutes simple, mechanical protocols at the pretrial stage for 
complex, fact-intensive inquiries at trial. This has the effect of reducing trial costs, not to 
mention expenditures on the remedies portion of litigation. Even if a fault rule does not reduce 
the volume of these cases, it does render their adjudication much easier. It is far easier to 
                                                            
319 Id.  
320 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106-07; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (limiting the availability of ex ante 
relief against law enforcement officers on grounds that anticipate the Lyons analysis).  
321 Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1399 n.57 (2000). 
322 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); accord Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 
494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). 
323 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (stating a preference for prefers narrow, 
as-applied challenges as opposed to the “strong medicine” of facial invalidation (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)); accord United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–22 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. 
v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912). 
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determine whether there has been a clear and unambiguous violation of a constitutional rule than 
to determine whether there has been any constitutional violation. This has the supplemental 
benefit of enabling delegation to adjuncts such as staff attorneys and law clerks, and thus easing 
the labor of adjudication.324 
 
Similarly, the distinction between challenges to laws (such as Susan B. Anthony) and 
challenges to institutional practices (such as Lyons) reflects the same concern about the 
managerial costs of different remedies.325 A challenge to an institutional practice may require a 
remedy that involves ongoing supervision and judicial involvement, whereas a challenge to a 
legal text can be resolved by the fiat of a judicial order. By making the former easier to obtain 
than the latter, the Court eases the demand for judicial resources. That is, different elements of 
the margin are congruent with judicial economy explanations.326  
 
This simple account can be supplemented by considering the bench’s institutional interest 
in public reputation.327 A judicial interest in prestige explains both the extent of the fault rule, 
and its exceptions. Federal judges have long expressed their belief that “federal courts” are “too 
important” for certain kinds of cases.”328 “Petty” cases are repudiated by leading jurists as ill-
suited to federal adjudication.329 Doctrine and judicial lobbying affirms this belief. For example, 
the Court developed through common-law adjudication an “appellate review” model of 
administrative agency oversight as a means to avoid being called upon to decide “matters that 
were not properly judicial but were rather ‘administrative’ in nature.”330 In effect, the appellate 
review model mitigated caseload demands created by the new federal regulatory state.  
 
Federal judges also preserve their prestige by preventing inflation of the federal bench. 
Seventy-five years after it refined the appellate review model, the federal judiciary has been 
among the most important lobbies in Congress resisting the extension of the prestigious Article 
                                                            
324 By contrast, other methods of mitigating case load burdens, such as “more detailed pleading and supporting 
affidavits, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 167, at 1821, might have the effect of sorting for nonfrivolous cases, but 
only by raising per capita decision costs.  
325 Bray, supra note 87, at 1146 n.247 (noting that Lyons can be explained by the “emphatically managerial 
injunction” sought in that case).  
326 Can these doctrinal distinctions also be explained in ideological terms? It is not implausible to think that 
challenges to laws have a different ideological valence to challenges to institutional practices. It suffices here to 
observe that doctrine advances both ideological and institutional interests, and it may be misleading and unnecessary 
to choose between the two.  
327  Accord LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 43, 48 (2013) (positing “the desire for a good 
reputation” as part of the judicial utility function).  
328 Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 924, 972 (2000) (tracing back arguments of this kind to Chief Justice Taft). 
329 Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by 
Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 980-82 (1926) (arguing that the Constitution does not require Article III judges or 
juries to determine “petty” criminal cases); see also ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1893) (invalidating 
jurisdiction that required courts to engage in “administrative” rather than judicial functions). 
330 Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of 
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 944, 990 (2011) (describing the federal judiciary’s “fear of 
contamination” by involvement in administration). 
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III badge to bankruptcy judges,331 while at the same time (without discernable irony) invalidating 
the latter’s review of state-law tort claims.332 This interest in preserving institutional prestige 
aligns with judges’ interest in managing caseloads, pressing federal courts away from the messy, 
unrewarding labor of adjudicating discrete, dispersed, and unglamorous constitutional violations. 
It justifies instead a priority for high-profile challenges to laws—all the best to reinforce the 
impression that federal courts are (or wish to be) high-minded forums of principle, not mere fact-
grubbers sorting through the detritus of the modern regulatory and police state. Cases such as 
Susan B. Anthony List and McCullen are exemplars of a species of prestigious, high-profile suit 
that is elicited by leaving unregulated the channels for injunctive or declaratory relief. The 
continued supply of these cases creates the impression of a Court diligent in its enforcement of 
the Constitution, even though the Court is spared the hard labor of vindicating most “petty” 
constitutional claims that arise from quotidian crime control and bureaucratic behavior.  
 
* * * 
 
This Part has developed evidence for the hypothesis that the institutional interests of the 
judiciary have shaped the emergence of the fault role. I have not tried to show that such interests 
are exclusive of other concerns. Rather, I have explored the inadequacy of political and 
ideological explanations, and then developed a circumstantial case for attributing some causal 
effect to the judiciary’s institutional interest in case management. The net effect, I hope, is to 
supply a more rounded, nuanced account of doctrinal change than the mechanically ideological 
stories that to date have dominated.  
 
III. Implications of the Fault Rule for Constitutional Remedies  
 
 The primary aim of this Article is to describe how scarce judicial resources are allocated 
to the task of constitutional remedies, and to offer a hypothesis about one set of causal forces that 
to date have been largely ignored. This Part turns from that descriptive and analytic task to some 
normative implications of the causal claim advanced here. To be clear, the causal linkage 
between judicial independence and remedial rationing that I have proposed in Parts I and II 
raises a host of important normative issues. My aim here is not to resolve all of those question, 
but rather to flag what strike me as the most important of them. Hence, I set forth some of the 
welfarist and distributive implications of fault-based rationing of remedial resources first, and 
then conclude by limning the consequences of the present analysis for standard accounts of the 
Separation of Powers.  
 
 
                                                            
331 Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part 
Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 347-53 & n.18 (2007) (describing various channels of influence from 
Chief Justice Burger and the federal judiciary into the drafting of the 1978 bankruptcy legislation, including formal 
testimony and backstage lobbying); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 157-58 (2001) (documenting longer pattern of judicial resistance).  
332 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011); see generally Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III 
Problem in Bankruptcy, -- U. CHI. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2015) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496468 (describing and criticizing this line of cases). 
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A. Welfarist and Distributive Implications  
 
The descriptive account offered in Parts I and II of this Article have illumined a doctrinal 
superstructure that imposes low transaction costs upon ex ante challenges to the verbal content of 
laws or regulation, and high transaction costs to both challenges to institutional practices, and 
also discrete requests for granular after-the-fact remedies. The latter forms of constitutional 
review, therefore, are prioritized over the former. This resulting system of implicit taxes and 
subsidies on private behavior has complex welfarist and distributional implications. 
Characterization of these effects depends on how one defines social welfare—which is 
controversial—and whether one thinks distributional concerns are salient—which is even more 
divisive. Rather than trying to answer these deep underlying questions, my aim here is to sketch 
briefly how constitutional remedies doctrine might effect valuable social ends without trying to 
define conclusively what those goals should be. I focus on three vectors of welfare and 
distributional effects from the doctrinal arrangements mapped in this Article that run through, 
respectively, different sorts of constitutional errors, different rights, and different litigants. My 
aim here in to pronounce judgments on those effects, but simply to elucidate their operation. 
 
First, the Court’s remedial doctrine entails that different kinds of constitutional errors 
receive different treatment. On the one hand, a constitutional flaw that is manifest on the face of 
a generally applicable statute or regulation, that operates directly against individuals as a primary 
rule without the intermediation of any prosecutorial discretion on the part of an enforcing 
agency, is most vulnerable to judicial correction. At the other end of the spectrum, a 
constitutionally flawed act or practice, unmemorialized in written text and dispersed through 
time and space in a sporadic, even stochastic, distribution, cannot be remedied ex ante. Instead, it 
will receive only the light review that can be exercised under the anesthetizing regime of the 
gross fault rule that covers ex post remedies. Stated otherwise, errors that occur during the 
liquidation of standards (which generally occurs after a violation) receive lighter judicial scrutiny 
than errors embedded in the formulation of a rule (which typically occurs before the 
violation).333 The doctrine hence creates a subtle tilt in favor of standards rather than rules where 
a risk of constitutional challenge is present.  
 
Second, variation in the transaction costs of different remedies influences the distribution 
of resources available for the enforcement of distinct rights. The fault rule raises the cost of 
enforcement where it applies because it demands a more onerous showing by litigants. This 
differential in enforcement costs intersects with differences between rights. Some rights are 
easier to enforce ex ante with an injunction, while others are easier to enforce ex post by 
damages, suppression, or the vacatur of a conviction. Lowering the price of ex ante enforcement 
thus favors some rights over others. To pick an uncontroversial example, First Amendment and 
Due Process rights related to participation in the democratic process334 are most valuable when 
enforced prospectively, and lack obvious commensurable monetary substitutes. After an election 
has been resolved, and one candidate is selected over others, there may be no good way to 
                                                            
333 For an analysis of the rules/standard distinction that underscores its temporal element, see Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562 (1992). 
334 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“In decision after decision, this Court has made clear 
that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in 
the jurisdiction); accord Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 
(1972). 
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mitigate fully infringements on democratic participation rights.335 Monetary damages would 
strike many as “hopelessly inadequate.”336 Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause can 
also be understood as the failure to treat members of a protected class “with dignity and 
respect.”337 Again, compensatory remedies seem poorly fitted to the particular harm of being 
treated as less than human. Dignity, perhaps by dint of intrinsic qualities, is not typically thought 
to be fungible with cash. 
 
On the other hand, there are many other rights that want for any prophylactic remedy, but 
are arguably addressed in a tolerable fashion via damages after the fact. In the takings context, 
for example, the Court has stated that that a property owner must pursue compensation through 
state procedures before a Fifth Amendment takings claim will “ripen” for the purposes of 
federal-court adjudication,338 and has declined to permit any acceleration of takings claims even 
when the process of state court adjudication generated preclusive effects that barred federal court 
relitigation.339 This reflects a (perhaps erroneous) belief that ex post remedies are at least 
adequate for unconstitutional takings. Even in the absence of formal constraints on ex ante 
remedies, moreover, practical and epistemic constraints may also render ex post claims the only 
viable pathway. Illegal home searches that generate no inculpatory evidence, for example, may 
not be predictable before the fact, but might be redressed only afterward. Indeed, even in 
jurisdictions were unconstitutional searches and police violence are endemic, Lyons means the ex 
post channels of tort actions, suppression motions, and postconviction relief are the only game in 
town. It is this class of rights better suited to ex post enforcement that are disincentivized by the 
fault rule.  
 
Finally, differences in remedial access will also differentiate between different categories 
of litigants, both on the plaintiff and on the state defendant side. Constitutional rights claimants 
are likely sensitive to the costs of judicial enforcement. Litigants’ epistemic and litigation 
resources influence the relative costs of different species of judicial remedy. An increase in the 
evidentiary showing or procedural hurdles necessary to secure monetary relief, for example, will 
therefore reduce the expressed demand for that form of judicial enforcement. The expected value 
of injunctive relief will vary, by contrast, depending on the litigant’s ability to anticipate and file 
suit prior to a governmental action. Along either margin, litigants’ demand for constitutional 
remedies is likely to be elastic.340 Changes in the relative prices of remedies will thus change the 
pool of litigants seeking remedies.  
                                                            
335 The analysis of aggregate voting rights (such as the rights of a particular ethnic or racial voting bloc) implicate a 
more complicated choice of temporal frame. See Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 361, 372-73 (2007). Damages are sometimes awarded. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
336 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 785 (1994) (developing a 
more general account of incommensurability problems in the law). 
337 Id. at 847 (discussing sex discrimination claims). 
338 Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
339 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005). The net effect of 
Hamilton Bank and San Remo Hotel is to not to deprive litigants of a federal forum; it is rather to leave the Supreme 
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction as the sole federal forum for certain takings claimants. Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. REV. 649, 656 (2012).  
340 Cf. Francis E. Mcgovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1845 (1995) (“[A] tort is 
elastic to the extent that the number of cases that are filed (demand) rises as the transaction costs associated with 
each case (price) are reduced and the number of judicial case resolutions increases (supply).”). Demand for judicial 
 52 
 
Consider, for example, the Court’s use of the fault rule to increase the cost of enforcing 
rights ex post relative to ex ante enforcement in many domains. In expectation, such a change 
will depress litigant demand for rights that can only be vindicated through monetary damages. At 
the same time, it will increase litigant demand in respect to rights that can only be vindicated 
fully by anticipatory intervention. It also lowers the cost of constitutional remediation for 
plaintiffs who have the epistemic and social resources to judicial assistance before a violation 
occurs, and increases the cost of such remediation for plaintiffs who lack the resources to act 
before the state does. Whether one looks at different effects between rights or litigants, therefore 
the result is the same: Some litigants gain, while others lose out. Changes to the relative 
transaction costs of different remedies is thus a way for judges to change the mix of litigants that 
benefit from the expenditure of what is in essence a fixed pool of taxpayer-supported judicial 
resources.341 Recalibrating remedies doctrine, in public choice terminology, is a vehicle for 
implicitly shifting the allocation of judicial resources between different interest groups. This 
redistribution—which is most likely regressive in character—is not free of normative 
implications. 
 
Finally, it is not only rights claimants who are treated differently under the current 
remedial dispensation. The doctrine also distinguishes between different state defendants. The 
current remedial architecture channels judicial resources toward the scrutiny of centralized fonts 
of legal authority (such as legislators or regulation-generating agencies), and away from 
dispersed, discretion-exercising officials (such as line officials within dispersed bureaucracies, 
prosecutors and the police342). Consistent with the decentralizing impulse at the core of 
American federalism, the remedial doctrine described here makes it easier to challenge to 
concentrated, top-down forms of law-making, and at the same time raises the price of challenges 
to dispersed, localized exercises of delegated authority. This result is particularly striking in the 
policing context. Recent ethnographies of urban policing have underscored the frequency and 
severity of routine violence inflicted by line officers, in particular in African-American 
communities.343 It is precisely the lowest visible forms of unconstitutional violence, which effect 
many of the least politically powerful communities in the United States, that the Court has 
rendered most difficult to remedy. This is consistent with Richard Posner, William Landes, and 
Lee Epstein’s general prediction that reduced access to federal courts “weighs most heavily on 
persons seeking to expand legal rights [such as] antidiscrimination rights [and] prisoners 
rights.”344  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
enforcement of some individual rights may be inelastic, such that increases in the price of judicial enforcement has 
no effect on the volume of litigation.  
341 The quantity of resources allocated to the judicial budget, of course, can vary from year to year, although in 
recently years the federal judiciary’s budget has been in decline. See Chief Justice John Roberts, 2013 Year-End 
Report on the Federal Judiciary 4-5 (2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2013year-endreport.pdf (describing five percent reduction in annual federal judicial budget).  
342 Accord William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 779 n.104 
(2006) (stating that Lyons “effectively barred injunctions as a remedy for police misconduct). 
343 See GOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 71-72 (exploring effects of pervasive police violence on public attitudes and 
behavior).  
344 EPSTEIN, et al. supra note 327, at 41.  
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Reasonable people will differ about whether these effects on different species of 
violations, different rights, and different litigants are warranted or lamentable, just as they 
disagree on how to prioritize between rights and litigants. I do not aim to settle those differences 
here. Nevertheless, this analysis should underscore the fact that the fault-based gatekeeping 
regime for allocating constitutional remedies, along with its doctrinal adjuncts, has significant 
downstream effects on important social goals—effects that are perhaps all the more surprising 
given the heterogeneous ideological composition of judicial coalitions responsible for that rule. 
The subtle way in which these effects arise means that they have never been subject to public 
scrutiny or debate. At a minimum, differences in ultimate normative priors should not undermine 
the conclusion that such sub rosa redistribution of the benefits that flow from our Constitution 
may be problematic simply because of its want of transparency.  
 
B. Implications for the Separation of Powers  
 
 A second implication of this Article’s analysis bites on Separation of Powers theory. The 
autonomy of the judiciary has long been conceived as a central plank of the Constitution’s 
separation of powers,345 one that fosters important public values such as the vindication of 
individual constitutional rights. But the existence of a causal connection between judicial 
independence and a fault-based rule for limiting the availability of constitutional relief 
complicates the traditional account of the judiciary’s role in the national government. At a 
minimum, it shows that the policy effects of judicial independence are more volatile than 
generally believed. Read more aggressively, the evidence presented here suggests that the 
successful institutionalization of judicial independence can undermine, as much as further, the 
project of realizing constitutional rights.  
 
There is a deep-seated belief in American constitutional jurisprudence of a causal 
connection between the creation of judicial independence and the vindication of individual 
rights. The French political theorist Montesquieu, an influential figure among the Framers, 
cautioned that “liberty” would be lost “that if the power of judging is not separate from the 
legislative power and from executive power.”346 Introducing the Bill of Rights to the first 
Congress, James Madison thus prophesized that “independent tribunals of justice” would act “in 
a peculiar manner [as] the guardians of those rights” and “an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive.”347 On this view, the purpose of judicial 
independence is to ensure that cases—especially those involving prized, basic rights—are 
decided on their legal merits (however defined) rather than on considerations of naked political 
power.348 Echoes of Madison’s confidence in the social value of judicial independence resound 
                                                            
345 Among the “Madison and Hamilton at least, judicial independence was an essential aspect of the separation of 
powers.” Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 320 (1999); see 
also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 299 
(1996) (noting that the Framers had “a substantive conception of the judiciary as the third branch of government”). 
346 2 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Cambridge ed. 1989) (“Nor is there liberty if the power of 
judging is not separate from the legislative power and from executive power. . . . If it were joined to executive 
power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.”); see also M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 96-97 (1967) (Liberty Fund 2d ed. 1998) (placing Montesquieu’s argument in context). 
347 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789). 
348 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial 
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 972 (2002) 
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repeatedly today. For example, Judge Deanall Tacha, while serving on the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals channeled conventional wisdom when she pronounced that “the independent federal 
judiciary has been a powerful tool in guarding the Constitution and the rights of individuals.”349 
Similarly Archibold Cox hardly invited controversy when he called “[a]n independent judiciary 
… the best guarantee of liberty and impartial justice against executive oppression and other 
executive or bureaucratic abuse.”350 The causal connection between judicial independence and 
the vindication of constitutional rights, in short, is for all intents and purposes conventional 
wisdom today.  
The analysis developed in this Article suggests that conventional wisdom demands 
serious caveats. The institutionalization of judicial independence does not lead inexorably to the 
vindication of individual constitutional rights. Rather, the effects of endowing the federal courts 
with policy autonomy are contingent upon the interests and preferences of judges qua 
institutional actors. When judges’ situated interests conduce away from the vindication of 
individual liberty interests, judicial independence will promote less, rather than more, respect for 
those rights. At least in the contemporary context, the institutional interests of federal judges 
have systematically pressed toward a constriction of remedial generosity. The result has been the 
transubstantive migration of the fault rule described in Part I.351 
Separation of powers theory concerning the judiciary from the Federalist 78 onward has 
focused on the negative proposition that judicial independence, and therefore the vindication of 
individual rights, simply requires that the courts by free of political influence.352 At least at the 
time of the Philadelphia Convention, this causal claim rested on theoretical premises rather than 
on experiential foundations. The division of executive and judicial power into two separate 
branches of government was a relative novelty in political theory.”353 Indeed, at least one 
element of the salient historical experience—the vigorous deployment of the habeas corpus writ 
by the King’s Bench in England at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century—suggested that it 
was feasible to have robust judicial oversight of liberty-infringing governmental powers without 
the formal accouterments of judicial independence. 354  Notwithstanding this experience, 
Separation of Powers theory assumes that the requirement of judicial as well as executive and 
legislative involvement in state-sponsored liberty deprivations will serve as a brake on the 
overzealous use of coercive power.355 
                                                            
349 Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century, 46 MERCER L. REV. 645, 645 (1995). 
350 Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 571 
(1996). 
351 The claim advanced here is distinct from the assertion that judges have class-based interests. See Louis Michael 
Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1581 (1988) (arguing that “independent judges 
are quite capable of confusing the public good with narrow ideological or class-based concerns”). My concern here 
is institutional, not ideological, motives.  
352 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasizing the 
judiciary’s lack of dependence).  
353 Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 
214 (1991); see also GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1777-1787, at 159-61 (1998) 
(discussing revolutionary-era difficulties “fit[ting] the judiciary into the scheme of government”). 
354 In the early 1600s, members of the King’s Bench exercised a vigorous oversight of monarchical authority that 
became a paradigmatic model for later advocates of the Great Writ. PAUL HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS FROM 
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64-84 (2010).  
355 For elegant modern restatements of this claim, see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal 
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But this is not necessarily so because of the self-defeating effects of institutionalizing 
judicial power. On the one hand, elected officials may have strong preferences for liberty that 
might be imposed on other, more recalcitrant state actors. Federal politicians, for example, 
sought to use federal courts to expand liberties in the teeth of state officials’ opposition.356 The 
presence of multiple centers of political power, therefore, introduces the possibility that political 
control over the judicial might lead to more libertarian outcomes. On the other if judges’ and 
rights-holders’ preference slip out of alignment, judges may fail to pursue libertarian ends, or 
may pursue them with suboptimal lethargy. Separation of powers theory, while expressing 
inexhaustible concerns about political-branch capture of the judiciary, supplies no mechanism 
through which the judiciary’s interests would become aligned with those of constitutional rights 
holders.357 And there is simply no a priori reason to think that the preferences of those on the 
federal bench will accord with the maximal protection of individual rights. Certainly, the mere 
absence of overt and ongoing political control cannot easily be equated with a vigorous passion 
for liberty. The case for tethering judicial independence to liberty becomes even more 
complicated when the Article II process of judicial selection is examined. For nothing in either 
the nomination and confirmation process, or the institutional setting of a court leads inexorably 
to a rights-related mission.358 Moreover, it is hard to view the Court’s history dispassionately and 
see a consistent and uniform commitment to all constitutional rights.  
And it gets worse: The historical and theoretical arguments developed here suggest that 
more successful the courts are at building up their institutional autonomy, the more likely they 
may be to have distinct corporate interests that are at odds with the interests of constitutional 
rights holders. That is, the very conditions that produce institutional stability for courts also 
undermine the incentives necessary for judicial vigor in pursuit of individual liberty interests. 
Given this trade-off between institutional capacity and institutional incentives, it seems 
reasonable to hesitate before assuming that the courts will always and necessary act in accord 
with stable libertarian preferences  
My analysis of the connection between judicial independence in its contemporary 
institutional form and the titration of constitutional remedies suggests that in the contest between 
institutional interests and concern for individual liberties, the latter has lost out as a historical 
matter. From the institutional perspective of federal courts, the constant stream of complaints 
thrown up by defective state courts, deficient police departments, and errant bureaucracies are a 
“petty” nuisance.359 The fault-based gatekeeping rule installed in the constitutional tort, habeas, 
and exclusionary rule context dramatically cuts down on the quanta of resources courts must 
allocate to these nuances. At the same time, it still leaves courts free to deal with more 
prestigious and higher profile facial challenges to laws that seek injunctive or declaratory relief.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1017 (2006); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1513, 1536-38 & n.102 (1991). 
356 See KEVIN MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE 138, 150-75 (2004). 
357 Note that the interests of different rights holders might conflict. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014) (resolving potential conflict between reproductive rights and religious liberty). There are many 
other examples. These show how hard it is to create an institution that protect the rights of all simultaneously.  
358 For an insightful analysis of the political forces that shape the judicial appointment process, see David R. Stras, 
Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (2008). 
359 Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 329, at 980. 
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Contemporary experience, in summary, suggests that when federal courts are allowed 
both the discretion and the instruments to follow through on their institutional preferences, the 
doctrinal results can be reduced enforcement of constitutional rights. It can also mean that many 
constitutional claimants never even obtain an opportunity to be heard in court, but rather see their 
claims deflected via summary pretrial process. This will inevitably lead to cases in which 
individual rights claims are deprived of any day in federal court to vindicate a constitutional right 
either before or after the fact—all because of policy judgments taken by the federal courts. In 
this fashion, judicial independence in its institutional form can be at war with the vindication of 
individual rights.  
The result here is consonant with a rich vein of scholarship expressing skeptical of the 
Separation of Powers. For example, Elizabeth Magill has powerfully argued that the ideas of 
balance and separation between branches cannot be cashed out meaningfully because “in the 
contested cases, there is no principled way to distinguish between the relevant power” and “no 
way to measure the distribution of power among the branches at any point in time and no method 
to predict the effect of an institutional arrangement.”360 Magill’s work trains on the conceptual 
integrity of the Separation of Powers and its consequences for the overall political system, rather 
than the specific effects of judicial independence. Complementing Magill’s account, Daryl 
Levinson and Richard Pildes have argued that “the degree and kind of competition between the 
legislative and executive branches vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on 
whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party.”361 Their 
argument, however, is tightly linked to the effects of party politics on legislative-executive 
relations.  
 
Supplementing that literature, this Article suggests that the policy effects of judicial 
independence—which is another mode of institutional separation of authorities—are far less 
constant or salutary than many have believed. Complementing work that excavates the limited 
ability of federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights in the face of political resistance,362 my 
excavation of the causal connection between judicial independence and constitutional 
remediation therefore suggests that those who hope to realize the Bill of Rights’ aspirations 
would do well not to follow its drafters advice: Independent courts, rather than the “peculiar … 
guardians” of constitutional rights may often act as their most implacable foes precisely because 
of their institutional interests qua courts.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central goal of this Article has been to describe the rise of a fault-based system for 
rationing both process and remedies for constitutional violations, and to hypothesize one cause of 
that ascendancy that the literature has ignored. Since the early 1980s, a moment at which courts 
                                                            
360 M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604-
05 (2001); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 
1155-57 (2000) (arguing that ideas of balance or separation provide no determinate answer to institutional design 
questions). 
361 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 27, at 2314. 
362 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) 
(analyzing the limits of school desegregation litigation under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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felt increasing pressure from the rise of mass incarceration, that regime has diffused from 
constitutional tort jurisprudence to both the evidentiary suppression and the postconviction 
habeas contexts. Scholars have failed to observe or study this doctrinal diffusion, or the 
concomitant unification of remedies doctrine across the three most frequently invoked mechanics 
for ex post redress for constitutional rights.  
 
The rise of fault-based rationing, I have hypothesized, is not just a function of changing 
judicial ideology. It is also a consequence of an independent federal judiciary pursuing its 
interests and preferences by shaping doctrine. It thus flows, in some nontrivial measure, from our 
commitment to judicial independence at the institutional level. The resulting legal landscape 
raises many hard questions of how constitutional rights can, or should, be vindicated. At the very 
least, the analysis presented here should call into question any easy or quick reliance on the 
courts as the first and last best protectors of constitutional rights, at least so long as they are free 
to pursue their own institutional interests.  
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